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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays in Corporate Finance 
 
Melissa Toffanin, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2012 
 
 This thesis examines two issues in corporate finance. The first two essays examine the 
influence of ownership structure on the relationship between ownership and firm value. The third 
essay examines the influence of an IPO on a firm’s lending arrangements. 
In the first essay, we examine the influence of the presence of multiple blockholders on 
ownership-firm value relationship. Additional blockholders can either form a coalition with or 
monitor the largest individual blockholder. We hypothesize that both of these alternatives will 
influence the shape of the observed ownership-firm value relationship and the choice will be 
influenced by blockholder identity. We find that while individual blockholders tend to form a 
coalition, corporate blockholders tend to monitor. We also find that the coalition formation effect 
is more pronounced in non-founder firms. Our results suggest that the relationship between the 
ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value critically depends on both the 
presence and identity of additional blockholders. 
In the second essay, we examine the influence of ownership structure on the observed 
relationship between inside ownership and firm value. We document the predominant type of this 
relationship for different types of ownership structures. Samples of firms with predominately 
individual blockholders tend to generate a convex relationship, while those with corporate 
presence generate a concave one. Thus, we find a much wider spectrum of inside ownership-firm 
value relationships than reported in prior studies. We show that much of the disagreement 
regarding the aforementioned relationship can be attributed to differing ownership structures of 
sample firms.  
iii 
In the third essay, we examine changes in covenants and yields of bank loans around IPO 
and link them to the changes in the extent of loan syndication. We document significant changes 
in lending arrangements around IPO and show there are significant reductions in both covenant 
intensity and yields around a firm’s IPO. The decline in yields is driven primarily by firms that 
switch to syndicated loans after IPO. Our results suggest that, by allowing more firms to access 
the syndicated loan market, IPOs are influential in determining the covenants and yields on post-
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis examines two issues in corporate finance. The first and second essays 
examine the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between ownership and firm 
value. The third essay examines the influence of an IPO on a firm’s lending arrangements. 
In the second chapter (first essay), we examine the influence of the presence of multiple 
blockholders on ownership-firm value relationship. Despite the potential significance of the 
interactions among blockholders, there has been relatively little theoretical or empirical work 
focusing on this issue until a recent revival of interest in this topic. Additional blockholders can 
either form a coalition with or monitor the largest individual blockholder. We hypothesize that 
both of these alternatives will influence the shape of the observed ownership-firm value 
relationship. Further, the choice between these two alternatives will be influenced by the identity 
of the blockholder, whether individual or corporate. We argue that these two blockholder types 
differ in three main dimensions – the ability to extract private benefits, short- or long-term focus, 
and external pressures – and these differences will influence their choice regarding whether to 
form coalitions with or monitor the largest individual blockholder.  
Overall, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find that the 
individual blockholders tend to form a coalition either to extract private benefits or to increase 
firm value. Corporate blockholders, on the other hand, tend to monitor. Second, the coalition 
formation effect is more pronounced in non-founder firms and when the second individual 
blockholder is not a founder. Overall, our results suggest that the relationship between the 
ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value critically depends on both the 
presence and identity of additional blockholders. 
In the third chapter (second essay), we examine the influence of ownership structure on 
the observed relationship between inside ownership and firm value. We draw upon the evidence 
presented in the first essay of this dissertation and test if the various forms of the relationship 
2 
found in the literature can be explained by differing underlying ownership structures. First, we 
document the predominant type of inside ownership-firm value relationship for different types of 
ownership structures. In particular, samples of firms with predominately individual blockholders 
tend to generate a convex relationship, while those with corporate presence generate a concave 
one. Thus, we find a much wider spectrum of inside ownership-firm value relationships than 
reported in prior studies.  
Second, we show that much of the disagreement in prior studies regarding the 
relationship between insider ownership and firm value can be attributed to differing ownership 
structures of the sample firms. In particular, we use the above findings and the sample selection 
criteria (and therefore the implied ownership structure) of prior studies to predict the observed 
inside ownership-firm value relationship. We are able to correctly predict a majority of the inside 
ownership-firm value relationships reported in prior studies. Overall, our findings suggest that 
ownership structure has a significant influence on the inside ownership-firm value relationship. 
In the fourth chapter (third essay), we examine changes in covenants and yields of bank 
loans around IPO and link them to the changes in the extent of loan syndication. Our findings can 
be summarized as follows. First, we document significant changes in lending arrangements 
around IPO – the percentage of firms using syndicated loans increases from 42% to 71%. Second, 
we show that there are significant reductions in both covenant intensity and yields around a firm’s 
IPO. Third, the decline in yields is driven primarily by firms that switch from non-syndicated pre-
IPO loans to syndicated post-IPO loans. The decline in covenant intensity, on the other hand, is 
driven primarily by firms that continue to use non-syndicated loans even after their IPO. Further, 
we find evidence of a decrease in covenant intensity for firms switching lenders after IPO. 
Finally, venture capitalist backing also influences the changes in covenant intensity and yields. 
Overall, our results suggest that, by allowing more firms to access the syndicated loan market, 
IPOs are influential in determining the covenants and yields on post-IPO bank loans. 
 
3 




A question that has been the catalyst of a plethora of research in corporate finance is that 
of the relationship between ownership and firm value. Much of the existing literature has framed 
this relationship as a trade-off between two opposing effects – incentive alignment and 
entrenchment.
1
 As noted by Fama (1980), both of these effects are likely to be influenced by the 
presence of (and interactions between) additional blockholders – either through monitoring or 
coalition formation. This, in turn, suggests that additional blockholders could influence firm value 
in two possible ways – directly through their actions and indirectly through their influence on the 
actions of the largest blockholder. Despite the potential significance of the interactions among 
blockholders, there has been relatively little theoretical or empirical work focusing on this issue 
until a recent revival of interest in this topic.
2
 We fill this gap in the literature by examining the 
influence of additional blockholders on the relationship between the ownership of the largest 
individual blockholder and firm value.
3
  
We hypothesize that the influence of additional blockholders on the observed ownership-
firm value relationship will depend on whether the additional blockholder chooses to form a 
coalition with or monitor the largest individual blockholder. First, consider the situation in which 
the largest blockholder forms a coalition with another (smaller) blockholder. We define a 
coalition as an agreement between blockholders to act based on the combined level of their 
                                                          
1
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the greater is the size of the blockholder’s stake, the greater is the 
focus on creating value over the long-term rather than private benefit extraction. Conversely, Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Stulz (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) each argue that higher levels 
of ownership increase blockholder power, leading to entrenchment and value-decreasing perquisite 
consumption at the expense of minority shareholders. The dominating effect still remains an empirical 
question. 
2
 Several recent papers have suggested that individual blockholders can have two opposing influences on 
firm value. On one hand, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that blockholders may attempt to form 
coalitions that can be used to extract private benefits from the remaining shareholders. Bloch and Hege 
(2001), on the other hand, argue that blockholders compete for control of the firm and thus the presence of 
multiple blockholders would act as a check on the rent extraction by the controlling blockholder. 
3
 To allow the relative importance of incentive alignment and monitoring effects to vary over different 
levels of ownership, we employ a quadratic specification throughout the paper. 
4 
ownership (as opposed to their individual stakes). Thus, by forming a coalition, the largest 
blockholder will have a larger effective ownership stake in the firm, which can have either a 
positive (increased incentive alignment) or a negative (increased entrenchment) influence on firm 
value.
4
 In other words, a coalition of two (or more) blockholders is more likely to achieve the 
level of ownership necessary either for entrenchment or incentive alignment as compared to the 
single blockholder case, ceteris paribus. This implies that a firm with multiple blockholders will 
have a significantly steeper relationship between ownership of the largest blockholder and firm 
value than a single blockholder firm.  
Second, suppose the additional blockholder were to monitor the largest one (see, e.g., 
Bloch and Hege, 2001). The benefits from monitoring will depend upon the level of the largest 
blockholder’s ownership. In particular, such benefits will be the largest at the level of ownership 
for which (in the absence of monitoring) the ownership-firm value relationship reaches its 
minimum.
5
 If this is the case, then the influence of monitoring on firm value will also vary with 
the level of the largest blockholder’s ownership. This suggests that the shape of the ownership-
firm value relationship in the presence of a monitoring blockholder will be significantly different 
from that observed in the case of a single blockholder. 
Further, we hypothesize that the propensity to engage in monitoring or coalition 
formation will depend upon the type of investor – individual or corporate.6 The following three 
characteristics make corporate blockholders less likely to engage in the formation of a coalition. 
First, they are less likely to be firm insiders and therefore less likely to reap private benefits of 
control. Second, their relatively shorter investment horizon is likely to make any coalition 
                                                          
4
 Our definition of coalition formation allows for both positive and negative coalitions. Thus, a coalition 
which increases the combined ownership into the incentive alignment (entrenchment) range can be viewed 
as a positive (negative) coalition. 
5
 This is conditional on the monitoring blockholder’s ability to influence actions of the largest blockholder. 
By definition, additional blockholders will not be able to influence an entrenched largest blockholder. We 
will have more to say about this in Section 2. 
6
 We define a corporate blockholder as a corporate entity not affiliated with any of the individual 
blockholders. These, among others, include institutional investors, such as mutual and pension funds, and 
various private and public non-financial corporations. 
5 
between them and the largest blockholder relatively short-lived. Therefore, the two parties may 
find it too costly to form a coalition. Third, corporate blockholders may have external pressures 
(e.g., fiduciary obligations) that make them more likely to monitor the largest blockholder. 
Therefore, we expect individual (corporate) blockholders to be more likely to form a coalition 
with (monitor) the largest blockholder. Finally, we hypothesize that the identity of the individual 
blockholders will also have a significant influence on the observed ownership-firm value 
relationship.
7
 Specifically, we expect the influence of founders to be different from that of non-
founders (we develop formal hypotheses in Section 2.2). 
Our findings support the hypothesis that the presence of additional blockholders is 
associated with a significant variation in the relationship between the ownership of the largest 
individual blockholder and firm value.
8
 First, as a benchmark, we find a convex relationship 
between ownership and firm value. Second, we find that the presence of an additional individual 
blockholder makes the convex relationship described above more pronounced. This is consistent 
with our prediction that in the presence of a coalition, the observed ownership-firm value 
relationship will be steeper than that observed in the case of a single blockholder firm. Third, we 
find that the presence of a corporate blockholder has a concave influence on the relationship 
between the largest individual blockholder’s ownership and firm value. This finding is consistent 
with our prediction that the benefits from monitoring by the corporate blockholders will be the 
largest at the level of ownership at which the ownership-firm value relationship reaches its 
minimum. Fourth, we find that the identity of the individual blockholder also matters. In 
particular, we find that in the presence of an additional blockholder, the ownership-firm value 
                                                          
7
 While the identity of the corporate blockholder may influence the observed ownership-firm value 
relationship, examination of such an influence is beyond the scope of the paper. 
8
 Note that we are only showing an association here. While it is possible that certain types of firms (e.g., 
with a particular value) attract a particular ownership structure, an examination of the causality is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
6 
relationship is less convex in founder firms (as compared to non-founder firms).
9
 Also, we find 
that the additional non-founder blockholder is more likely to form a coalition with the largest 
blockholder, while the additional founder blockholder tends to monitor.  
Our findings are related to and contribute to several streams of research. The first is the 
emerging literature on blockholder ownership. The findings of Holderness (2009) indicate that 
blockholders are more prevalent in the US than formerly believed. Moreover, the work of 
Bennedson and Wolfenzon (2000), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bloch and Hege (2001) suggest 
that the presence and interaction of multiple shareholders could affect firm value. However, the 
empirical evidence on the interaction of multiple blockholders is sparse. Most of this literature, 
however, has focused on the number of blockholders and the dispersion of their ownership stakes 
(see, e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; and Konijn et al., 2011).
10
 Our 
approach differs in that we allow the influence of multiple blockholders to vary with the level of 
the largest blockholder’s ownership. We find that the positive influence of additional individual 
blockholders is largely confined to firms with low and high ownership levels of the largest 
blockholder. In contrast, the positive influence of corporate blockholders is mainly observed in 
firms with intermediate levels of ownership of the largest blockholder. We also find that there is a 
range of ownership for which the presence of multiple blockholders has at best a neutral influence 
on firm value. In other words, the influence of additional blockholders varies by both the level of 
the largest blockholder’s ownership and the identity of the additional blockholders. 
Second, we also contribute to the extensive literature on the relationship between 
(insider) ownership and firm value. While the presence of additional blockholders has been 
extensively used as control variable in prior studies on the topic, we are not aware of any study 
that has explicitly allowed for the presence of additional blockholders to change the slope (as well 
                                                          
9
 From now onwards, we will refer to firms in which the largest individual blockholder is (is not) the 
founder as founder (non-founder) firms. 
10
 There is also an emerging literature that argues that blockholders influence firm value through exit 
threats (see, e.g., Bharat et al., 2011). 
7 
as intercept) of the observed ownership-firm value relationship. The study closest to our own in 
this respect is that of Kim and Lu (2011). They show that the concave relationship between CEO 
ownership and firm value is present only in firms with low institutional ownership concentration, 
their proxy for weak external governance.
11
 Firms with strong external governance, on the other 
hand, are found to have an insignificant relationship. Our approach extends the work of Kim and 
Lu (2011) in several dimensions. First, while they examine the influence of institutional investors 
holding stakes of any size, we focus on blockholders, who, by virtue of the size of their 
ownership stakes, are more likely to exert a significant influence on actions of the largest 
blockholder. Second, we examine all blockholders, not just the institutional ones. Further, our 
results differ from those of Kim and Lu (2011) – we show that corporate blockholders have a 
concave influence on the ownership-firm value relationship (as opposed to the convex one 
implied by their results).  
Third, our study contributes to the literature on the influence of shareholder identity on 
ownership-firm value relationship (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Barclay and 
Holderness, 1991; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009). In particular, 
our findings of significant differences between individual and corporate blockholders in terms of 
their influence on the ownership-firm value relationship suggests that treatment of these two 
types of blockholders as a homogeneous group (as is frequently done in the literature) may result 
in misleading inferences.  
Further, we contribute to the family firm literature. While some studies document the 
positive influence of founders on firm value, others find that their presence destroys value.
12
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that agency costs are higher in non-founder firms than in firms 
having both founder and non-founder shareholders and the founder is the CEO. When a 
                                                          
11
 Their measure of concentration is the sum of the ownership stakes of the five largest institutional 
investors.  
12
 A detailed review of the contradictory findings in this literature is presented in Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester, and Cannella (2007). 
8 
descendant of the founder is the CEO, the opposite relationship holds. Fahlenbrach (2009) finds 
that firm value is significantly higher in firms where the founder is the CEO. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988) find that the presence of a founder in a younger (older) firm is associated with 
higher (lower) Tobin’s q, with the latter finding being indicative of an entrenchment effect. Stock 
prices are found to increase upon the death of managing founders (Johnson et al., 1985) and 
blockholders (Slovin and Sushka, 1993). We contribute to this literature by examining the 
differing influences of founder and non-founder blockholders on the ownership-firm value 
relationship. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop 
hypotheses that will be the basis of our empirical tests. Section 2.3 describes the data employed in 
this study. Section 2.4 provides the empirical tests and discusses the results. Section 2.5 
concludes. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
2.2.1. The influence of coalition formation and monitoring on the ownership-firm 
value relationship 
We now formalize the hypotheses described above and discuss in more detail why and 
how the identity of additional blockholders influences the relationship between the largest 
individual blockholder’s ownership and firm value.  
As discussed above, by forming a coalition, the largest blockholder will have a larger 
effective ownership stake in the firm. For example, if two blockholders of a firm, owning 35% 
and 25%, were to form a coalition, they would behave like a firm with a 60%, rather than 35%, 
blockholder. Whether such a coalition will have a positive or a negative influence on firm value 
depends upon the relative importance of incentive alignment and entrenchment effects. For the 
range of ownership in which the incentive alignment effect dominates, a coalition will have a 
positive influence on firm value as the larger effective ownership stake will better align her 
9 
interests with those of minority shareholders. For the range of ownership in which the 
entrenchment effect dominates, a coalition will have a negative influence on firm value as the 
larger effective ownership stake will make her more entrenched. Therefore, firms with multiple 
blockholders will have a significantly steeper relationship between ownership of the largest 
blockholder and firm value as compared to a single blockholder firm. This argument leads us to 
our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: In the presence of a coalition formation, the relationship between the 
ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value will become steeper. 
We also argued above that the benefits from monitoring will be the highest at the level of 
ownership for which, in the absence of monitoring, the ownership-firm value relationship is at its 
minimum. The necessary condition for the monitoring benefits to be realized is that the additional 
blockholders are able to influence the actions of the largest. In particular, consider the following 
two cases. First, a concave relationship between ownership and firm value reported by a number 
of prior studies (e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990) has two minima – one at zero percent and 
another at 100 percent ownership. The monitoring benefits will be the highest around zero 
percent ownership since at this point the potential improvements and the ability to influence the 
largest blockholder will be the greatest. Beyond the maximum of the function, the potential 
benefits from monitoring will be increasing again, but the ability of the monitoring blockholder to 
influence the largest will decline rather significantly. This implies that realized benefits from 
monitoring will be low or non-existent for this ownership range. Therefore, in the case of a 
concave relationship, we would expect to observe the largest difference in the ownership-firm 
value relationship at low levels of the largest blockholder’s ownership. 
 Second, suppose the observed ownership-firm value relationship in the absence of 
monitoring is convex. In this case, we would expect the monitoring benefits to be the highest at 
intermediate levels of ownership. They will be lower at low levels of ownership (since the private 
benefits of control will be lower in this range) and at high levels (because both the benefits from 
10 
monitoring and the ability to influence the actions of the largest blockholder are lower in this 
range). Therefore, in the case of a convex relationship, we would expect to observe the largest 
difference in the ownership-firm value relationship at intermediate levels of the largest 
blockholder’s ownership. This argument leads us to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The benefits from monitoring will be the highest at the level of ownership 
for which the ownership-firm value relationship (in the absence of monitoring) is at its 
minimum, subject to an additional blockholder’s ability to influence actions of the largest 
blockholder. 
 
2.2.2. Coalition formation versus monitoring: the role of blockholder identity 
We now discuss the influence of a blockholder’s identity on their propensity to engage in 
either coalition formation or monitoring. There are three factors that influence a blockholder’s 
participation in a coalition. First, they have to benefit from joining a coalition. Second, they have 
to have a long-term commitment to the firm since it will be too costly for the largest blockholder 
to form a coalition with short-term blockholders. Further, such coalitions would be rather 
unstable. Third, blockholders may have external pressures and reputation concerns that can 
influence their propensity to engage in coalition formation. We discuss these factors in detail.  
The main difference between individual and corporate blockholders is their status in the 
firm. While individual blockholders are usually insiders (see, e.g., Holderness, 2003), corporate 
blockholders are more typically outsiders. This observation implies that individual blockholders 
have two potential ways of benefiting from the formation of a coalition – by increasing their 
private benefits of control (negative coalition) and by increasing the value of their ownership 
stake (positive coalition). Corporate blockholders, on the other hand, have only the latter way of 
benefiting from a coalition formation. The relative absence of a corporate blockholder’s access to 
private benefits rules out the formation of a negative coalition, while monitoring can be seen as 
equivalent to the formation of a positive coalition. Overall, this suggests that individual 
11 
(corporate) blockholders will be more likely to form a coalition with (monitor) the largest 
blockholder. 
Individual and corporate blockholders are also likely to differ in terms of the length of 
their commitment to the firm. In particular, individual blockholders are more likely to have a 
long-term commitment as compared to corporate blockholders.
13
 Since a coalition between long-
term and short-term blockholders is likely to be relatively short-lived, we expect that both parties 
will find it too costly to form a coalition. Therefore, we expect a coalition between individual and 
corporate blockholders to be less likely than one between two individual blockholders. 
Finally, as noted by Davis and Kim (2007) and Connelly et al. (2010), the obligations of 
institutional investors toward their clientele may make them more likely to monitor the actions of 
the largest blockholder.
14
 Also, corporate blockholders are more likely to have reputation 
concerns, especially if they are actively involved in the governance of their portfolio companies 
(see, e.g., Gilson, 1990). Both of these considerations are also likely to lead to a higher propensity 
for monitoring by corporate blockholders. 
The three factors discussed above suggest that corporate (individual) blockholders are 
less (more) likely to form a coalition with the largest blockholder. This leads us to our third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Individual blockholders are more likely to form a coalition with the largest 
blockholder, while corporate blockholders are more likely to monitor. 
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 Whether corporate blockholders are long-term or short-term investors has been subject to a considerable 
debate. See, e.g., Graves and Waddock (1990), Jacobs (1991), Laverty (1996), Porter (1992), and 
Dobrzynski (1993). 
14
 The empirical evidence on monitoring by corporate blockholders (institutions) is contradictory. Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988), Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) all 
find evidence supporting the monitoring role of institutional blockholders. Conversely, Chen, Harford, and 
Li (2007) report that some institutional investors find it more beneficial to achieve private gains through 
trading (as opposed to gains from monitoring), while Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that institutional 
investors unhappy with firm performance will vote with their feet. Also, broadly-invested (diversified) 
institutional shareholders (e.g., mutual and pension funds) may find it difficult to maintain an in-depth 
knowledge about each firm in which they have a stake. 
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The identity of the individual blockholder can also indicate power beyond that implied by her 
ownership stake. In particular, following the literature on the special nature of founder and family 
ownership (see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; Palia and Ravid, 2002; Li and Srinivasan, 2011), we distinguish between founder 
and non-founder blockholders. Their intimate knowledge of the firm, long-term focus, and 
founder status are likely to make the founder the most influential blockholder in the firm. This 
has two implications. First, an additional blockholder in a founder firm (i.e., with a founder as the 
largest blockholder) will have a smaller influence, as compared to that in a non-founder firm. 
This implies a flatter (less steep) ownership-firm value relationship in founder firms with multiple 
individual blockholders. Second, the additional blockholder who is the founder is likely to have a 
significantly different influence than one who is not the founder. On one hand, their long-term 
commitment to the firm is likely to make a founder blockholder more likely to engage in a 
coalition formation, especially if the largest blockholder is also a founder. On the other hand, a 
founder blockholder may be more independent of the largest blockholder and therefore be more 
likely to engage in monitoring. The dominating effect remains an empirical matter. This 
discussion leads us to our last two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: An individual blockholder will have less influence in a founder firm as 
opposed to a non-founder firm.  
Hypothesis 5: The influence of a founder blockholder will be different from that of a non-
founder blockholder. 
 
2.3. Data and sample selection 
We test the above hypotheses using a sample of newly public firms. We choose a sample 
of newly public firms for two reasons. First, multiple individual blockholders are more likely to 
be present in these firms which allows us to examine the interactions among them. While 25% of 
our sample firms have at least two individual blockholders, only 9.4% of the Dlugosz et al. 
13 
(2006) sample of index-listed firms does. Second, corporate shareholders (apart from venture 
capitalists) are likely to play a less prominent role in the newly public firms, allowing us to 
observe large individual blockholders in the absence of significant corporate blocks. Thus, our 




We start with all US IPOs of common equity between 1993 and 1996, obtained from the 
SDC/Platinum New Issues database.
16
 We eliminate REITs, closed-end funds, unit offerings, 
equity carve-outs, financial firms (those with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities, 
foreign firms, leveraged buyouts, and roll-ups. We also eliminate firms which are not found in the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or COMPUSTAT databases. Finally, we remove 
firms for which there is a discrepancy between the first date of trading provided by CRSP and 
SDC. We are left with a total of 1,448 firms. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes how we arrived at 
this sample. 
We follow these firms for up to 12 years after the IPO or until delisting, whichever comes 
first. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of our sample by post-IPO year. COMPUSTAT 
data requirements reduce the sample size for various tests. Of the 1,448 firms at the time of IPO, 
356 survive until the 12
th
 listing anniversary. Our total sample consists of 10,402 firm-year 
observations with available ownership and accounting data. We define a blockholder (whether 
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 It can be argued that, to the extent that IPOs are subject to market valuation driven waves, our sample of 
newly public firms may not be representative of all public firms. To address this potential criticism, we are 
following our sample firms for up to 12 years after the IPO. Market conditions at the time of going public 
are unlikely to influence market valuations several years after the IPO. 
16
 Our choice of 1993 to 1996 IPOs as the basis of our sample is motivated by two considerations. First, 
availability of pre-1993 IPO prospectuses on Thomson Research, our source of pre-Edgar filings, is limited. 
Second, to ensure that we have a sufficiently long (post-IPO) time-series, we choose to limit our sample to 
firms that went public before 1997. 
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 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require the disclosure of ownership positions of 
(1) all officers and directors and (2) all shareholders holding more than 5% of any class of shares.  
14 
For tractability purposes and ease of exposition, we classify our sample firms into 
subcategories based only on the top three blockholders. For example, if the top three blockholders 
in the firm are all corporations, we classify such a firm as having a corporate blockholder and no 
individual blockholders, irrespective of the presence and identity of any blockholders beyond the 
third. Further, we do not distinguish between the firms with one and more than one additional 
blockholder of the same type. That is, we do not distinguish between firms with two and more 
than two individual blockholders. Similarly, we do not distinguish between firms with one and 
more than one corporate blockholder. While the additional blockholders may matter, an 
examination of such differences is beyond the scope of the paper.  
Table 2 provides the description of the presence and ownership of the largest individual, 
second individual, and corporate blockholders in our sample firms. In 231 (2.2%) firm-years there 
are no blockholders, neither individual nor corporate, present. In 1,208 (11.6%) firm-years the 
only blockholder present is an individual, while in 3,397 (32.7%) firm-years only corporate 
blockholder(s) is (are) present. In the remaining 5,566 (53.5%) firm-years there is more than one 
blockholder present. More specifically, in 1,480 (14.23%) firm-years there are only multiple 
individual blockholders present, while in 2,922 (28.1%) firm-years there is one individual 
blockholder and at least one corporate blockholder present. Finally, in 1,164 (11.2%) firm-years 
there are multiple individual and at least one corporate blockholder present. Overall, multiple 
individual blockholders are present in 25.4% firm-years, while corporate blockholders are present 
in 71.9% of firm-years. 
The largest individual blockholder, on average (median), controls 28.3% (21%) of voting 
rights. The ownership stake of the largest individual blockholder varies with the ownership 
structure (i.e., the presence of other blockholders) and her identity. In particular, if the largest is 
the sole blockholder, she, on average (median), controls 49.4% (52.4%) of voting rights. 
Conversely, in a firm with multiple individual and corporate blockholders, she controls, on 
average (median), 20.7% (17.1%) of votes. Also, founders represent 65.8% of the largest 
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individual blockholders in our sample. They tend to have larger controlling stakes as compared to 
non-founders – 32.3% (25.6%) versus 20.5% (14.4%), on average (median). Second individual 
blockholders, when present, hold significant ownership stakes – 12.6% (10.7%) of votes, on 
average (median). Of these blockholders, 62.6% are founders. Finally, the largest corporate 
blockholders control, on average (median) 15.7% (11.7%) of voting rights. 
 
2.4. Empirical tests and results 
This section reports the results of our empirical tests. We begin by examining the effect 
of the largest individual blockholder’s ownership on firm value in Section 4.1. We then examine 
the impact the presence of a second individual blockholder has on the above relationship in 
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we examine how the ownership-firm value relationship changes in the 
presence of the founder as the largest and second individual blockholder. In Section 4.4, we 
examine the impact of the presence of a corporate blockholder on the ownership-firm value 
relationship. Appendix 1 lists the variables used in this study, while Table 3 provides relevant 
summary statistics both for the overall sample and by ownership structure classification. 
 
2.4.1. The influence of the largest individual blockholder on firm value 
 We now examine the relationship between the ownership of the largest individual 



























     
(1) 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, which is defined as the ratio of book value of assets plus the 
market value of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. Largest 
individual own is the percentage of voting rights controlled by the largest individual blockholder. 
Largest individual own
2
 is Largest individual own squared. Largest individual wedge is the 
difference between the voting and cash flow rights of the largest individual blockholder. Control 
16 
variables (as defined in Appendix 1) are Ln(Firm size), Leverage, Sales growth, R&D, 
Diversification, and Delaware, as well as year and the Fama-French industry dummies.  
  The results of the empirical tests of Eq. (1) are reported in column 1 of Table 4. We find 
that the coefficient estimate for γ1 is negative, while the coefficient estimate for γ2 is positive, and 
they are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Our results imply a convex 
relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value. This 
suggests that entrenchment effect dominates the incentive alignment effect at low levels of 
ownership while the opposite is true at high levels. 
 As argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012) and others, ownership and firm 
value (performance) may be endogenous. More specifically, the results of any study of the 
ownership-firm value relationship may be biased in the presence of unobservable firm 
heterogeneity. Therefore, ordinary least-squares (OLS) tests may be vulnerable to biases that arise 
from this potential endogeneity of ownership. In order to alleviate this bias, three main 
approaches are generally used: proxy (control) variables, firm fixed effects in panel data, and 
instrumental variables. Each of these approaches has problems of its own. Zhou (2001) argues 
that due to the static nature of ownership over time, firm fixed effects may be inappropriate. 
Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012) argue, however, that none of these methods is an effective 
solution to the endogeneity problem.
 18
  
For endogeneity correction in traditional (linear) OLS specifications, the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach is generally used. However, given our quadratic specification of the 
relationship between the largest individual blockholder’s ownership and firm value, the 2SLS 
approach is likely to be inappropriate. Wooldridge (2002) notes that when a model is linear in 
parameters but nonlinear in endogenous variables the identification must be treated differently. 
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 They propose a structural model approach which uses numerical methods to calculate exogenous 
parameters jointly determining CEO ownership and performance. 
17 
We thus employ the nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS) approach proposed by Amemiya 
(1974), which permits consistent estimates of regression coefficients in nonlinear models (for 
additional details, refer to Appendix 4). 
We choose the instruments as follows. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) note that 
corporate fraud has recently been observed in large firms that are major regional employers and 
they argue that private benefits of control are higher in these types of firms. Additionally, they 
argue that private benefits of control will also be higher for firms having a large proportion of the 
total sales in a given region. Based on these arguments, we argue that ownership stakes will be 
more attractive in these types of firms. Thus, we use Sales/Regional sales and %Sales as 
instrumental variables, each as defined in Appendix 1.
19
  
The results of the N2SLS estimation are provided in column (2) of Table 4. As before, 
the coefficient estimate for the largest individual block is negative, while the coefficient estimate 
for the squared term is positive, and the significance has increased to the 1% level for both 
estimates. This finding suggests that the convex relationship documented above is unlikely to be 
driven by endogeneity. 
  
2.4.2. The influence of an additional individual blockholder on the ownership-firm 
value relationship 
 We now examine the effect of the presence of a second individual blockholder on the 
relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value. We do 
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 Based on the recommendations in Bowden and Turkington (1984) and Davidson and McKinnon (2004), 
we also include the squares and cross-products of all exogenous and instrumental variables as instruments. 
18 
Second is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if there is at least one more individual 
blockholder present among the top three blockholders, and zero otherwise. If the largest and 
second individual blockholders form a coalition, we would expect the coefficient estimates of γ4 
and γ5 to be negative and positive, respectively. Conversely, if the second individual blockholder 
monitors the largest, we would expect the coefficient estimates of γ4 and γ5 to be positive and 
negative, respectively. 
 The results of the OLS estimation of Eq. (2) are reported in column 1 of Table 5. Similar 
to the results in Table 4, we find a convex relationship between the size of the largest individual 
block and firm value. Moreover, in the presence of an additional individual blockholder the 
convex relationship becomes more pronounced. In particular, we find that the coefficient estimate 
for γ4 is negative, while the coefficient estimate for γ5 is positive, with the coefficient estimates 
being statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
20
 The results support our 
conjecture that individual blockholders are likely to form a coalition.  
It should also be noted that the coefficient estimate of second individual dummy is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that firms with more than one 
blockholder have a higher value, on average. Thus, the presence of an additional individual 
blockholder has a twofold influence on the firm value – it influences both the shape of the curve 
(making it steeper) and the position of the curve (shifting it upwards). To better understand how 
these two effects influence the observed ownership-firm value relationship, we plot the estimated 
relationship in Figure 1. Our results suggest that in the presence of an additional individual 
blockholder, firm value is higher if the largest individual blockholder owns less than 15% or more 
than 40% (approximately).  
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 The results of the N2SLS estimation of Eq. (2), reported in column 2 of Table 5, are qualitatively similar 
to those estimated using OLS. 
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As approximately half of our sample firms are backed by venture capitalists (VC), VC 
backing is an important consideration for our sample of newly public firms. As a robustness test, 
we examine their potential influence on the ownership-firm value relationship documented 
above.
21
 Using Eq. (2), we include interaction terms with VC, a dummy variable equal to one if 


































    
(3) 
 
The results of the empirical tests of Eq. (3) are reported in column 1 of Table 6. The 
coefficient estimates of γ4 and γ5 are positive and negative, respectively. Our results thus suggest 
that venture capitalists have a concave impact on the ownership-firm value relationship through 
their influence on the largest individual blockholder, indicating that VCs play a monitoring role. 
 As a second robustness test, we examine whether constraining the largest individual 
blockholder to be an insider of the firm changes the observed relationship. The literature 
generally defines an insider in a firm to be an individual involved either in management or on the 
board of directors. We employ this definition and re-estimate Eq. (2) constraining the largest 
individual blockholder to be a manager or director in the firm. The results are reported in column 
2 of Table 6. Overall, we find very similar results to those in the individual case as most of the 
largest individual blockholders in our sample are either a manager or director of the firms in 
which they have invested. Overall, there exists a significant convex relationship between the 
ownership of the largest inside blockholder and firm value, and the convexity of the relationship 
increases in the presence of a second individual. 
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 We identify VCs from various issues of Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources. 
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2.4.3. The influence of the individual blockholder’s identity on the ownership-firm 
value relationship 
We now examine the effect of the identity of the largest individual blockholder and firm 
value. We focus here on the difference between founder and non-founder blockholders. We 
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The results of the estimation of Eq. (4) are reported in column (1) of Table 7. We find no 
significant differences between founder and non-founder largest blockholders in terms of their 
direct influence on the firm value – the coefficient estimates for the non-founder interactive 
terms, γ4 and γ5, are insignificant. We do, however, find significant differences between founder 
and non-founder firms when considering the influence of an additional individual blockholder. In 
particular, in the founder case, an additional individual blockholder makes the relationship more 
convex (γ6 and γ7 are significantly negative and positive, respectively). The non-founder 
interactive terms, (γ8 and γ9), which capture the difference between the founder and non-founder 
case, are also significantly negative and positive, respectively. To put it differently, additional 
individual blockholders have a significantly more convex influence on the ownership-firm value 
relationship in non-founder firms than in founder firms. Overall, our results provide support to 
Hypothesis 4, in which we stated that an individual blockholder will have less influence in a 
founder firm as opposed to a non-founder firm.  
Again, to better understand how the identity of the largest individual blockholder changes 
the ownership-firm value relationship, we plot the estimated relationship in Figure 2. There are 
several things to note. First, single blockholder firms in which the founder is the largest 
21 
blockholder have higher value than do firms in which she is not a founder. This holds for the 
entire spectrum of ownership. Second, the presence of additional individual blockholders in a 
non-founder firm has the most negative influence on firm value for ownership range below 50% 
and has the most positive influence above 57% ownership stake (approximately).  
We additionally examine the influence of the identity of the second individual 
blockholder on the ownership-firm value relationship. Our focus once again is on the difference 
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The results of the estimation of Eq. (5) are provided in column (2) of Table 7. We find 
significant differences between the cases where the second individual blockholder is and is not 
the founder. In particular, the convex influence of the presence of an additional individual 
blockholder documented above is largely driven by non-founder second individual blockholders – 
the coefficient estimates of γ6 and γ7 are significantly negative and positive, respectively. At the 
same time, we find some evidence that the second founder blockholder has a concave influence 
on the relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value. 
The coefficient estimates on γ4 and γ5 are positive and negative, respectively, with only the former 
being significant at the 10% level. Our results suggest that a founder blockholder is more 
independent of the largest blockholder and is more likely to engage in monitoring. 
Again, we also find that the coefficient estimates on the second individual dummy and 
the dummy denoting the presence of the second non-founder are positive and statistically 
significant. To better understand how the identity of the second individual blockholder changes 
the ownership-firm value relationship, we plot the estimated relationship in Figure 3. As can be 
22 
seen from the figure, for an ownership stake between 12% and 60% (approximately), a firm in 
which founder is the second individual blockholder has a higher value than a firm in which he or 
she is not the founder.  
  
2.4.4. The influence of a corporate blockholder on the ownership-firm value 
relationship  
 We now examine the effect of the presence of a corporate blockholder on the relationship 
between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value. We do so by 
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Corporate is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if one of the three largest blocks is 
held by a corporate entity, and zero otherwise. If corporate blockholders do in fact monitor the 
largest individual blockholder, we would expect the coefficient estimates of γ6 and γ7 to be 
positive and negative, respectively. 
The results of the empirical tests of Eq. (6) are reported in column 1 of Table 8. Similar 
to the results in Table 5, we find a convex relationship between firm value and the size of the 
largest individual’s block, and that the presence of an additional individual blockholder makes the 
convex relationship even more pronounced. When considering the impact of a corporate 
blockholder, we find that the coefficient estimate for γ6 is positive, while the coefficient estimate 
for γ7 is negative, with the coefficient estimates being statistically significant at the 10% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Our results thus imply a concave impact of the presence of a corporate 
blockholder on the ownership-firm value relationship. The results support the second part of 
Hypothesis 3 – the benefits from monitoring are highest when the ownership-firm value 
23 
relationship (in the absence of a corporate blockholder) is the lowest. We plot the estimated 
relationship in Figure 4.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the influence of interactions between 
multiple blockholders on the relationship between ownership and firm value. Our results suggest 
that the relationship between ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value is 
significantly affected by the presence of additional blockholders, both individual and corporate. 
We find that individual blockholders are more likely to form a coalition with the largest 
blockholder and thus make the observed ownership-firm value relationship steeper. The corporate 
blockholders, on the other hand, tend to monitor the largest blockholder and thus change the 
shape of the observed ownership-firm value relationship.  
Furthermore, we find that the identity of individual blockholders matters. In particular, 
we find that the second individual blockholder has a larger influence (either positive or negative) 
when the largest individual blockholder is not a founder. Similarly, a second individual 
blockholder who is not a founder is more likely to form a coalition with the largest blockholder, 
while the founder counterpart is more likely to monitor. Overall, our results suggest that the 
relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value critically 




CHAPTER THREE – THINKING INSIDE THE BLOCKS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
A fundamental issue in corporate finance is the relationship between insider ownership and 
firm value. Much of the existing literature has framed this relationship as a trade-off between two 
opposing effects – incentive alignment and entrenchment. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
the greater is the size of the insider’s stake, the greater is the focus on creating value over the 
long-term rather than private benefit extraction. Conversely, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), 
Stulz (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) each argue that higher levels of ownership 
increase insider power, leading to entrenchment and value-decreasing perquisite consumption at 
the expense of minority shareholders.  
The dominant of the two effects at various levels of insider ownership has implications 
for the shape of the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. More specifically, if 
the incentive alignment effect dominates at low levels of insider ownership and entrenchment 
effect dominates at high levels, the relationship is likely to be concave. On the other hand, if the 
entrenchment effect dominates at low levels of insider ownership and the incentive alignment 
effect dominates at high levels, the relationship is likely to be convex.  
However, the empirical evidence on this issue has been frustratingly contradictory, with 
researchers reporting various forms of the insider ownership-firm value relationship. McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) find a concave relationship between insider ownership and firm value, while 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no relationship 
at all. On the other hand, Slovin and Sushka (1993) find evidence consistent with a convex 
relationship between the ownership of the inside blockholder and firm value. Still others report a 
more complex nonlinear relationship. For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) employ a 
piecewise linear regression, while other specifications have been considered by McConnell, Lins, 
and Servaes (2008) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009), among others.  
25 
We draw upon the evidence presented in the first essay of this dissertation and test if the 
various forms of the relationship found in the literature can be explained by differing underlying 
ownership structures.
22
 Many of these prior studies on the insider ownership-firm value 
relationship rely on samples of large, index-listed firms. Two stylized facts about such firms – the 
low level of insider ownership and significant presence of corporate investors – suggest that a 
particular type (and a certain degree of uniformity) of ownership structure.
23
 Our unique hand-
collected panel dataset of newly public firms allows us to make the broadest inferences possible 
regarding the influence of ownership structure on the insider ownership-firm value relationship. 
In particular, in this sample we can observe a variety of different ownership structures, ranging 
from firms with only insider blockholders to those with corporate blockholders as well.  
We draw upon the evidence presented in the first essay of this dissertation and test if the 
various forms of the relationship found in the literature can be explained by differing underlying 
ownership structures.
24
 Many of these prior studies on the insider ownership-firm value 
relationship rely on samples of large, index-listed firms. Two stylized facts about such firms – the 
low level of insider ownership and significant presence of corporate investors – suggest that a 
particular type (and a certain degree of uniformity) of ownership structure.
25
 Our unique hand-
collected panel dataset of newly public firms allows us to make the broadest inferences possible 
regarding the influence of ownership structure on the insider ownership-firm value relationship. 
In particular, in this sample we can observe a variety of different ownership structures, ranging 
from firms with only insider blockholders to those with corporate blockholders as well.  
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 An emerging literature has shown that multiple blockholders influence firm value. See, e.g., Pagano and 
Roell (1998), Maury and Pajuste (2005), Laeven and Levine (2008), and Konijn, Kraussl, and Lucas 
(2011). 
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 See, e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Chung and Zhang (2011), respectively. 
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 An emerging literature has shown that multiple blockholders influence firm value. See, e.g., Pagano and 
Roell (1998), Maury and Pajuste (2005), Laeven and Levine (2008), and Konijn, Kraussl, and Lucas 
(2011). 
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 See, e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Chung and Zhang (2011), respectively. 
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As reported in the first essay, we find that the presence of outsider blockholders makes the 
observed ownership-firm value relationship more convex, while the presence of corporate 
blockholders has a concave influence.
26
  We build on these findings and split our sample by the 
presence of additional blockholders in the firm. We then proceed to show that widely different 
ownership structures lead to widely different relationships between ownership and firm value. We 
define firms with only insider blockholder as Type A, firms with insider and corporate 
blockholders as Type B, firms with insider and outsider blockholders as Type C, and firms have 
all three blockholder types as Type D. For Type A and C firms, we find a significant and convex 
relationship between ownership and firm value. For Type B and D firms, however, that 
relationship is insignificant. 
We further posit that the manner in which ownership structure affects the ownership-firm 
value relationship changes over time. As firms mature, they are more likely to attract analyst 
coverage and face increased pressures from the market for corporate control.
27
 As such, firm 
behaviour (more specifically, the behaviour of firm insiders) is likely to change, and, 
correspondingly, so will the relationship between ownership and firm value. We allow for this 
possibility by splitting the above four subsamples by time since IPO. We continue to find a 
convex relationship between ownership and firm value for Type A firms (i.e, those with only 
insider blockholders), irrespective of the time since the IPO. In contrast, for firms with a 
corporate presence (but no outsider presence), we find significant differences over time. In 
particular, for younger firms, we find an insignificant insider ownership-firm value relationship, 
while for their older counterparts, the relationship is significantly concave. Overall, we find that 
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 We define an outside blockholder as any individual blockholder who is not part of the firm’s 
management or on the board of directors. We define a corporate blockholder as a corporate entity not 
affiliated with any of the individual blockholders. These, among others, include institutional investors, such 
as mutual and pension funds, and various private and public non-financial corporations. 
27
 See, e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), who report significantly more analyst coverage for larger firms. 
They report that 18% of firms in the lowest firm-size quintile have analyst coverage, while 94.4% of firms 
in the largest quintile have analyst coverage.  
27 
by splitting our sample based on easily identifiable characteristics of ownership structure we can 
obtain the whole spectrum of ownership-firm value relationships. 
Our findings suggest that there should be a direct correspondence between the underlying 
ownership structure and the results observed. For example, a study that analyzes large firms, such 
as that of McConnell and Servaes (1990), is likely to find a concave relationship between 
ownership and firm value. On the other hand, one that resembles the work of Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and analyzes a random sample of firms is unlikely to find a significant 
relationship. This insignificance follows from the fact that a random sample can include firms 
with widely different ownership-firm value relationships (due to diverse ownership structures). 
We survey all papers published in the top eleven Finance and Economics journals since the 
seminal work of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) that directly address this issue and find a 
startling correspondence between the sample selection criteria used in the various studies (and 
therefore the ownership structures of the sample firms) and the reported results.
28
  
Our findings also contribute to (and have implications for) the following literatures. First, 
researchers have noted methodological and theoretical issues that could result in misleading 
conclusions regarding the ownership-firm value relationship (see, e.g., Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
and Palia, 1999; Zhou, 2001).
29
 The previous literature, however, has largely neglected the role of 
sample selection. We show that the choice of sample can have a significant influence on the 
observed results. In this aspect, our work is similar in spirit to that of Kole (1995), who examines 
the role played by ownership data source as a potential explanation for the contradictory results 
between McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and concludes 
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 We look at Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Cho (1998), Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2010), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Holderness, 
Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999), Kim and Lu (2011), McConnell and Servaes (1990), McConnell and 
Servaes (1995), and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). Of these eleven studies, eight report results that 
are consistent with our predictions while the other three report results that are largely consistent with our 
predictions.  
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 See also Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012) for an alternative viewpoint.  
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that while differing data sources cannot explain the contradiction, differing sizes of sample firms 
may play a role. 
Second, an emerging literature has focused on the influence of multiple blockholders on 
firm value (see, e.g., Bennedson and Wolfenzon, 2000; Pagano and Röell, 1998; Bloch and Hege, 
2001; Konijn, Kraussl, and Lucas, 2011; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008). 
We contribute to this growing literature by analyzing the interactions between insiders and 
additional blockholders and find that these interactions have a significant influence on the 
observed ownership-firm value relationship. 
Finally, we show systematic changes in the ownership structure of firms as they age. These 
changes are non-trivial in that they significantly influence the relationship between ownership and 
firm value. Our findings have the potential to inform future research on the life cycle of the firm 
(see e.g., Bernardo and Chowdhry, 2002; Grabowski and Mueller, 1975; Mueller, 1972).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
data employed in this study. Section 3.3 provides the empirical tests and discusses the results. 
Section 3.4 discusses the implications of our findings for the ownership-firm value literature. 
Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Data and sample selection 
Our sample is obtained as follows. We start with all US IPOs of common equity between 
1993 and 1996, obtained from the SDC/Platinum New Issues database. We eliminate REITs, 
closed-end funds, unit offerings, equity carve-outs, financial firms (those with SIC codes between 
6000 and 6999), utilities, foreign firms, leveraged buyouts, and roll-ups. We also eliminate firms 
which are not found in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or COMPUSTAT 
databases. Finally, we remove firms for which there is a discrepancy between the first date of 
trading provided by CRSP and SDC. We are left with a total of 1,448 firms. Panel A of Table 9 
summarizes how we arrived at this sample and Panel B of Table 9 reports the distribution of our 
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sample by post-IPO year. Of the 1,448 firms at the time of IPO, 356 survive until the 12
th
 listing 
anniversary. Our total sample consists of 10,402 firm-year observations with available ownership 
and accounting data.  
We follow the approach taken by a majority of the previous studies on the ownership-
firm value relationship and focus on insider ownership (defined here as the sum of the ownership 
stakes of all insider blockholders) as the main variable of interest. We define a blockholder 
(whether individual or corporate) as any entity owning more than 5% of voting rights as reported 
in the proxy statements.
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 We collect data on each individual blockholder’s ownership stake as 
well as his involvement in the management and governance of the firm. We then classify each 
individual blockholder as being either an insider or an outsider. An individual blockholder is 
considered to be an insider if he is either a manager or a director of the firm. Any other individual 
blockholder is considered to be an outsider. 
Table 10 provides a description of the ownership structures of the firms in our sample. In 
particular, we report the proportion of firms in each of the following four categories: (1) firms 
with no insider or outsider blockholders; (2) firms with only insider blockholders; (3) firms with 
only outsider blockholders; and (4) firms with both insider and outsider blockholders. We further 
refine the analysis to incorporate the presence/absence of corporate blockholders.  
Firms in our sample have no insider blockholders in 31% of firm-years (231 without and 
2,999 with corporate presence) and only insider blockholders in 20% of firm-years. The smallest 
proportion (0.3% of firm-years) occurs where only outsider blockholders are present, while 4% of 
the firm-years in our sample have both insider and outsider blockholders. Overall, our sample 
firms are more likely than not to have at least one corporate blockholder – they are present in 
74% of firm-years. Thus, our sample contains a wide range of ownership structures, ranging from 
firms with no blockholders to those having all three blockholder types, enabling us to determine 
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 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require the disclosure of ownership positions of 
(1) all officers and directors and (2) all shareholders holding more than 5% of any class of shares.  
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the role played by underlying ownership structure in the relationship between ownership and firm 
value. 
 
3.3. Empirical tests and results 
This section reports the results of our empirical tests. We begin by examining the effect 
of insider ownership on firm value in Section 3.3.1. In Section 3.3.2, we examine the impact the 
presence of outsider and corporate blockholders have on the above relationship. In Section 3.3.3, 
we split our sample by the four firm types described above and show differences in the 
ownership-firm value relationship between subsamples. In Section 3.3.4, we examine how the 
ownership-firm value relationship changes with both the presence of additional blockholders and 
market seasoning. Appendix 2 lists the variables used in this study, while Table 11 provides 
relevant summary statistics both for the overall sample and by ownership structure classification. 
 
3.3.1. The influence of insider ownership on firm value 
We now examine the relationship between insider ownership and firm value, as proxied 
by Tobin’s q. We do so by estimating the following regression equation: 






























                          (7) 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, measured as the ratio of book value of assets plus the market 
value of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. Insider own is the sum 
of the voting rights controlled by insider blockholders. Insider own
2
 is Insider own squared. 
Insider wedge is the difference between voting and cash flow rights of the insider blockholders. 
Control variables (as defined in the Appendix) are Ln(total assets), Leverage, Sales growth, 
R&D, Delaware, Diversification, as well as year and Fama-French industry dummies.  
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The results of the empirical tests of Eq. (7) are reported in Table 12. Column 1 reports the 
results for the OLS regressions. We find that the coefficient estimate for γ1 is negative, while the 
coefficient estimate for γ2 is positive, and these coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Our results thus imply a convex (U-shaped) relationship between insider ownership and 
firm value for newly public firms.  
As argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012) and others, ownership and firm 
value (performance) may be endogenous. More specifically, the results of any study of the 
ownership-firm value relationship may be biased in the presence of unobservable firm 
heterogeneity. Therefore, ordinary least-squares (OLS) tests may be vulnerable to biases that arise 
from this potential endogeneity of ownership. In order to alleviate this bias, three main 
approaches are generally used: proxy (control) variables, firm fixed effects in panel data, and 
instrumental variables. Each of these approaches has problems of its own. Zhou (2001) argues 
that due to the static nature of ownership over time, firm fixed effects may be inappropriate. 
Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012) argue, however, that none of these methods is an effective 
solution to the endogeneity problem.
31
  
For endogeneity correction in traditional (linear) OLS specifications, the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach is generally used. However, given our quadratic specification of the 
relationship between insider ownership and firm value, the 2SLS approach is likely to be 
inappropriate. Wooldridge (2002) notes that when a model is linear in parameters but nonlinear in 
endogenous variables the identification must be treated differently. We thus employ the nonlinear 
two-stage least squares (N2SLS) approach proposed by Amemiya (1974), which permits 
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 They propose a structural model approach which uses numerical methods to calculate exogenous 
parameters jointly determining CEO ownership and performance. 
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Similar to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) we use Sales / Regional sales and %Sales 
as instrumental variables. We also include the cross products of all control variables and 
instruments. As discussed in Davidson and McKinnon (2004) and Bowden and Tarkington 
(1984), our relatively large sample size indicates that this approach of using powers and cross 
products of instruments could yield a satisfactory means of improving asymptotic efficiency 
without creating a serious finite sample bias.  
The results are provided in column 2 of Table 12. As before, the coefficient estimate for 
insider ownership is negative, while the coefficient estimate for the squared insider ownership is 
positive, and both are significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that the convex 
relationship documented above is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of insider ownership.  
 
 
3.3.2. The influence of outsider and corporate blockholders on the ownership-firm 
value relationship 
We now examine the manner in which the presence of outsider and corporate 
blockholders influences the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. We do so by 









































Outsider is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if an outsider individual blockholder is 
present in the firm, and zero otherwise. Corporate is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 
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 As described by Davidson and McKinnon (2004), the term “nonlinear two-stage least squares” proposed 
by Amemiya (1974) is somewhat misleading as the estimation does not proceed in two stages but is 
completed by projecting the regression problem into the linear space defined by the instruments. 
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one if a corporate blockholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. Control variables (as 
defined in the Appendix) are Ln(Firm size), Leverage, Sales growth, R&D, Delaware, and 
Diversification, as well as year and industry dummies.   
If it is the case that individual blockholders monitor each other as suggested by Fama 
(1980), we would expect the coefficient estimates of γ3 and γ4 to be positive and negative, 
respectively. Conversely, if the individual blockholders form a coalition we would expect the 
coefficient estimates of γ3 and γ4 to be negative and positive, respectively. In addition, if it is the 
case that corporate blockholders do in fact monitor insider blockholders, we would expect the 
coefficient estimates of γ6 and γ7 to be positive and negative, respectively. 
The results of the empirical tests of Eq. (8) are reported in Table 13. Similar to the results 
in Table 12, our OLS regressions suggest a convex relationship between insider ownership and 
firm value. Moreover, in the presence of an outsider blockholder the convex relationship becomes 
more pronounced. In particular, we find that the coefficient estimate for γ4 is negative, while the 
coefficient estimate for γ5 is positive, with both coefficient estimates being statistically significant 
at the 1% level. When considering the impact of a corporate blockholder, we find that the 
coefficient estimate for γ6 is positive, while the coefficient estimate for γ7 is negative, with both 
coefficient estimates being statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results thus imply a 
concave impact of the presence of a corporate block on the ownership-firm value relationship.  
As before, we employ a nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS) approach using the 
same instrumental variables mentioned above. The results are provided in column 2 of Table 13. 
The coefficient estimate for γ1 is negative, while the coefficient estimate for γ2 is positive, and 
both are significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the earlier results, the outsider seems to 
increase the convexity of the insider ownership-firm value relationship (coefficient estimates of γ3 
and γ4 are significant at the 1% level), while the presence of a corporate blockholder makes the 
relationship more concave (coefficient estimates of γ6 and γ7 are significant at the 5% and 1% 
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levels, respectively). Taken together, these findings suggest that the relationships documented 
above are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity.  
 
3.3.3. Presence of additional blockholders and the ownership-firm value relationship 
We further examine how the relationship between insider ownership and firm value 
differs based on the presence of additional blockholders. As shown in the first essay, the presence 
and identity of additional blockholders, both individual and corporate, influence the ownership-
firm value relationship – individual blockholders have a convex influence and corporate 
blockholders have a concave influence. As our main focus in this essay is insider ownership, we 
incorporate the findings of the previous essay by examining the impact of outsiders (individual 
blockholders) and corporate blockholders on the insider ownership-firm value relationship. In 
order to do so, we thus split our newly public sample into four subsamples based on the 
presence/absence of outsider and corporate blockholders, as described above. We re-estimate Eq. 
(7) for each subsample and the results are reported in Table 14.
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For Type A firms (column 1), we find that the coefficient estimates for γ1 and γ2 are 
significantly negative and positive, respectively. Our results thus imply a convex relationship 
between insider ownership and firm value for this type, similar to that found for the overall 
sample. For Type B firms (column 2), we find the coefficient estimate for γ1 is positive, while the 
coefficient estimate for γ2 is negative. While the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant 
at traditional levels, the results imply a more concave relationship between insider ownership and 
firm value for these firms, similar to that generally found for large, index-listed firms.  
The relationship for Type C firms (i.e. those with insider and outsider individual 
blockholders) is similar to that of Type A firms, and the coefficients are much larger in 
magnitude (column 3). Thus, outsider blockholders increase the convexity of the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm value. For the Type D firms (i.e., those with all three 
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 Due to insufficient observations in the four (and later, eight) subsamples, we are unable to provide 
nonlinear 2SLS results beyond this point. 
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blockholder types (column 4)), we find that the coefficient estimates for γ1 and γ2 are negative and 
positive, respectively, though statistically insignificant at traditional levels. The finding of 
insignificance for this subsample is unsurprising as the convex influence of both insider and 
outsider blockholders is (in part) counteracted by the concave influence of the corporate 
blockholders. 
Overall, by splitting our sample on observable firm characteristics such as the presence of 
an additional blockholder, we find either a convex or insignificant relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value.  
 
3.3.4. The influence of market seasoning and additional blockholder presence on the 
ownership-firm value relationship 
Once a firm begins public trading, it is not likely to remain static, but rather evolves over 
time under the scrutiny of the market. Increased reporting requirements, analyst following, and 
the market for corporate control all serve to shape firm behaviour (i.e., the behaviour of its 
insiders) and we thus predict that the relationship between insider ownership and firm value will 
change as well. In addition, corporate blockholders become more influential (move up in the 
shareholder ranking) over time, thus changing the firm’s monitoring environment. We refer to the 
combinations of these changes as the “seasoning” effect. We now examine how the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm value differs based on both the effects of blockholder 
presence and market seasoning. 
In order to examine these effects, we estimate Eq. (7) separately for eight subsamples, 
dividing each of the above four types into younger and older subsamples based on time since 
IPO. We define younger (older) firm-years as those occurring within (after) seven years following 
their IPO.
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 We posit that the relationship between insider ownership and firm value for older 
Type B firms will be concave, similar to that generally found for large, index-listed firms. On the 
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 We split the sample of firm-years at the seventh year as it marks the midpoint of our data set. Results are 
robust to splitting the sample at the sixth and eighth years as well. 
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other hand, their younger counterparts will exhibit a weaker (less concave) relationship given the 
relative absence of seasoning. The OLS tests of Eq. (7) for each subsample are reported in Table 
15. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 present the results for younger firms, while columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 
present corresponding results for older firms.  
In order to examine the seasoning effect in tandem with that of blockholder presence, we 
compare younger and older firms for each type. As we are grouping on blockholder presence and 
are controlling for firm characteristics, we posit that any differences between the pairs can be 
attributable to the market seasoning effect.
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 For younger firms with only corporate presence 
(Type B), we find that the coefficient estimates for γ1 and γ2 are negative and positive, 
respectively, but are statistically insignificant at traditional levels. Thus, the concave influence of 
corporate blockholders counterbalances the previously-described convex relationship for younger 
firms. Conversely, for older firms with a corporate presence, we find that the coefficient estimate 
for γ1 is positive, while the coefficient estimate for γ2 is negative, and the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Our results imply a concave 
relationship between insider ownership and firm value for these firms.  Thus, the relationship 
between ownership and firm value moves from insignificant to concave as a Type B firm 
becomes more seasoned. 
For younger firms with only outsider blockholders (Type C), we find that the coefficient 
estimates for γ1 and γ2 are negative and positive, respectively, and are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Thus, the previously-described convex relationship for younger firms remains 
unchanged. Conversely, for older firms with outsider blockholders, we find that the coefficient 
estimates for both γ1 and γ2 are positive, but are statistically insignificant at traditional levels. 
Thus, the relationship between ownership and firm value moves from convex to insignificant as a 
Type C firm becomes more seasoned.  
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analysis. However, we argue that any survivorship bias introduced would be similar to that in all studies of 
established (mature) firms, which are, by definition, surviving firms. 
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For younger firms with all three blockholder types (Type D), we find that the coefficient 
estimates for γ1 and γ2 are negative and positive, respectively, but only the former is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Thus, the previously-described convex relationship for younger firms 
is weak. Conversely, for older Type D firms, we find that the coefficient estimates for γ1 and γ2 
are positive and negative, respectively, but are statistically insignificant at traditional levels. Thus, 
the relationship between ownership and firm value moves from marginally convex to 
insignificant as a Type D firm becomes more seasoned. Overall, we show that we can replicate all 
forms of the ownership-firm value relationship, from convex to insignificant to concave. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
Up to this point, our results indicate that the insider ownership-firm value relationship 
could be concave or convex, depending on the type of firms studied. We now evaluate our 
conclusions by comparing them against the results of prior studies examining the insider 
ownership-firm value relationship. In particular, we expect studies using samples consisting of 
large, index-listed firms to find a concave relationship between ownership and firm value. 
Similarly, studies using smaller firms should find a convex relationship and studies using a 
random sample (implying a mix of large and small firms) should find no significant relationship.  
We examine this hypothesis using studies published in the top eleven Finance and 
Economics journals using US data. These journals are defined as The Review of Financial 
Studies (RFS), Journal of Finance (JF), Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF), Journal of 
Corporate Finance (JCF), Financial Management (FM), Journal of Business (JB), Journal of 




The studies are listed in Table 16. While we also include studies employing linear 
specifications of the ownership-firm value relationship (Panel B), to facilitate our comparison we 
focus on papers using either a quadratic or piecewise linear specification (Table 16, Panel A). 
Furthermore, though family ownership is an important subset of insider ownership, we note that, 
for the following two reasons, the list of family ownership papers included in Panel B of Table 16 
is by no means exhaustive. First, a family firm can be defined in a variety of ways (see, for 
example, the literature review in Miller et al., 2007). Second, not all studies require that the 
ownership stake of a family be large enough for the family to be a blockholder of the firm. As our 
focus is on insider blockholders, inconsistencies among definitions and minimum ownership 
levels can make comparability inappropriate. Thus, our literature review includes only those 
studies which are directly comparable to our own.  
We make a prediction regarding the ownership-firm value relationship based on the 
sample selection criteria used by each study in question. We then compare our predictions with 
the reported results. Of the eleven studies found, we can correctly predict the results of eight 
studies.
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 For example, the study by McConnell and Servaes (1990), which uses a sample of large 
firms, finds a concave relationship between ownership and firm value. On the other hand, 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) analyze a random sample of 600 Compustat firms and 
find no significant relationship. This finding of insignificance can be attributable to the mixture of 
firms having differing ownership structures (and therefore ownership-firm value relationships as 
well).  
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 The three studies for which our prediction is not fully consistent with the study’s results are Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2010), Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999), and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999). The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) study uses only dual-class firms in their analysis, and both 
voting and cash flow rights are included in their specifications, making direct comparison infeasible. The 
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) study uses two samples from 1935 and 1995. We can correctly 
predict the results for the 1935 sample, but our prediction for the 1995 sample of Compact Disclosure firms 
is inconsistent with their finding that firm value increases over the 0-5% range and is unchanged for 
ownership levels above 5%. However, a potential explanation of the inconsistency is the finding by 
Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006) of large biases in Compact Disclosure data. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) find an insignificant relationship in their main regressions, but find 
evidence of a concave relationship in their instrumental variable regressions; however, the significance 
does not hold upon inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
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A potential limitation of this comparison is that we do not benchmark our predictions to 
the large number of studies that address the ownership-firm value relationship indirectly using 
other methodologies, such as event studies. These studies can provide indirect evidence regarding 
the relationship between ownership and firm value. For example, Slovin and Sushka (1993) 
examine the market reaction to inside blockholder deaths. Since their sample firms have at least 
one individual blockholder, by definition, the study sample is more likely to isolate the convex 
relationship we find for the individual blockholders. They find a concave relationship between the 
ownership of the deceased blockholder and the abnormal return at the death announcement, 
evidence which is consistent with a convex relationship between ownership and firm value prior 
to the announcement. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
This paper revisits a fundamental issue in corporate finance – the relationship between 
insider ownership and firm value. Although the nature of this relationship has been empirically 
debated for over two decades, we are still very far from reaching a consensus on the issue. We 
contribute to this literature by showing that the differences in ownership structure of sample firms 
are an important factor contributing to the diversity of results found in prior studies.  
We do so by drawing on recent research regarding the influence of multiple blockholders 
on firm value. In particular, we examine the influence of the presence of outsider and corporate 
blockholders on the observed insider ownership-firm value relationship. We find that for firms in 
which only insider blockholders are present there exists a statistically significant convex 
ownership-firm value relationship. For old firms with corporate blockholders, on the other hand, 
there is a statistically significant concave relationship.  
Our paper has important implications for the literature. First, it shows that widely 
different ownership structures lead to widely different ownership-firm value relationships. In fact, 
we show how a simple split of a sample by easily observable characteristics of ownership 
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structure can lead to a full spectrum of relationships – from a convex to insignificant to concave. 
Second, it highlights the influence of sample selection on the insider ownership-firm value 
relationship. In particular, we show that the predominantly concave relationship between 
ownership and firm value found in the literature holds only for firms with significant corporate 
presence, as is the case with most large and mature firms.  
Third, there is a prescriptive element to our study. Researchers using random samples of 
firms should analyze subgroups based on the presence of additional blockholder. On the other 
hand, those using firms with homogeneous ownership structures should exercise caution when 
generalizing their results for the wider universe of American firms. Finally, to our knowledge, our 
study is one of the first that attempts to integrate the emerging literature on blockholders with the 
older literature on the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Although there 
have been numerous prior studies on each of these issues separately, integrating these two lines of 
inquiry will help us attain a much deeper understanding of the role of various groups of 






CHAPTER FOUR – THE EFFECT OF A FIRM’S IPO ON ITS IOU 
 
4.1. Introduction 
A firm’s IPO brings about changes in both its information and contracting environments, 
influencing its lending arrangements. The significant disclosure requirements in order to be 
publicly traded, along with frequent reporting requirements and analyst coverage after IPO, 
substantially increase the available information about the firm. As a result, there is an increase in 
the competition for the provision of bank loans to the newly public firm. This increased 
competition could manifest either as a change in lender or as a threat of such change.
37
 The 
reduction in information asymmetry and the resulting changes in lending arrangements are likely 
to lead to changes in the covenants and yields of post-IPO bank loans. This interaction of 
covenants, yields, and syndication surrounding an IPO has not yet been explored in the literature 
and this paper fills that gap. 
We examine a sample of loans taken by 2,613 IPO firms over the period 1993-2000 and 
find that both covenants and loan yields decrease after the IPO. This evidence is consistent with 
the reduction in information asymmetry surrounding the IPO and the resulting increase in lender 
competition. Consistent with increased competition, we find that the IPO significantly increases 
the percentage of loans that are syndicated from 42% of loans before IPO to 71% after. Further, 
these changes in lending agreements have a significant influence on both the covenants and 
yields. In particular, firms having non-syndicated loans both pre- and post-IPO experience a 
decrease in covenants without achieving a decline in yields. In contrast, firms that move to 
syndicated loans after the IPO experience a substantial decline in yields along with a significant 
increase in covenant usage. These results hold up even when covenants and yields are jointly 
estimated. We also find some evidence of a decrease in covenant intensity for firms that switched 
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 In addition, a lender may no longer be able to meet the firm’s growing financing needs alone or it may 
wish to diversify the risk of the loan in its own portfolio through syndication. The IPO thereby increases the 
likelihood of a move from relationship banking to arms-length financing. 
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lenders after IPO – covenant intensity for loans to most of the non-switchers is not significantly 
affected by the IPO. In addition, we find evidence of differences in covenant intensity for venture 
capitalist-backed (VC) and non-VC-backed firms, suggesting that the role played by the IPO on 
loan terms is influenced by VC presence. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the existing literature 
regarding the trade-off between covenants and yields. Bradley and Roberts (2004) find a 
significant inverse relationship between covenant intensity and private debt yields. For public 
debt issues, Chava et al. (2004), Reisel (2004), and Goyal (2005) each find that the cost of debt 
declines with covenant usage. Demiroglu and James (2010) also find that more restrictive 
covenants are associated with lower yields. Thus, there appears to be a trade-off – firms wanting 
to lower their yields may only be able to do so by taking loans with greater covenant intensity.  
Second, we contribute to the relatively sparse literature concerning the joint estimation of 
covenants and yields.
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 As the covenants on a loan and its yield are determined jointly based 
primarily on characteristics of the borrowing firm, covenant intensity and loan yields are likely to 
be endogenous. We account for this endogeneity and find the above results robust.  
Third, we contribute to the literature regarding changes in bank lending around IPO. 
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Sunder (2004) each document a post-IPO decrease in a 
firm’s cost of debt. Schenone (2010) finds that, irrespective of changes in financial risk, the IPO 
results in lower loan yields as the banks no longer have an information monopoly over the firms. 
We show that the decline in yields reported in these studies is not uniform – it applies only to 
certain types of firms (e.g. those using syndicated loans after IPO). Thus, we find evidence that 
the ability of an IPO to resolve the bank holdup problem as in Schenone (2010) is a function of 
loan syndication. Firms with non-syndicated loans after IPO do not experience a reduction in loan 
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yields. 
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yields. Also, to our knowledge, we are the first to show significant changes in covenants around 
IPO. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
data employed in this study. Section 4.3 provides the empirical tests and discusses the results. 
Section 4.4 provides the results for the joint estimation of covenants and yields. Section 4.5 
examines the effect of changing lenders on covenants and yields, while Section 4.6 examines the 
influence of VC backing. Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2. Data samples and methodology 
We begin by considering all initial public offerings in the Securities Data Corporation 
Platinum database over the period 1993-2000 by U.S. firms.  We then exclude IPOs by financials 
(SIC code 6000 to 6999 inclusive) and utilities (SIC code 4900 to 4949 inclusive). Consistent 
with prior research in IPOs, we further exclude equity carve-outs, leveraged buyouts, unit 
offerings, roll-ups, and closed-end funds. Firms with no data available on either the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or COMPUSTAT databases and firms with inconsistent first 
trading dates between SDC and CRSP are excluded as well.  After these exclusion criteria are 
employed, 2,613 IPOs remain in the sample. Panel A of Table 17 provides the distribution of the 
IPOs by year. 
We next match the sample of IPOs to the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database, 
which provides comprehensive loan data for U.S. firms.  As Dealscan does not report traditional 
company identifiers such as CUSIP or PERMNO, we manually match each IPO firm to the firms 
in Dealscan based on firm name and ticker, and confirm consistency by comparing SIC codes.  
Using this approach, we are able to find a match for 1,749 firms in the IPO sample.  These firms 
took a total of 5,724 loan “packages” – groups of loans made to a single firm at the same time. 
We exclude packages whose purpose is listed as takeover financing or as leveraged/management 
buyout financing as these loans would likely not be representative of the majority of loans taken 
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by firms to finance their general day-to-day operations and whose yields and covenants, therefore, 
could incorporate effects other than those arising from the IPO.  
We further exclude loan packages which are not denominated in U.S. dollars (as in Barry 
et al, 2009) and those which have an incomplete deal status, leaving a total of 4,783 loan 
packages comprising 6,715 individual loans (Dealscan uses the term “facility”).  Of these 
individual loans, we exclude those for which covenant and loan yield data are unavailable. As our 
focus is on changes in covenants and yields around IPO, in our empirical analysis we consider 
only those firms which have loans both before and after their IPOs. In addition, to best measure 
the influence of the IPO, we consider only the loans closest to the IPO, both before and after. 
After setting these criteria, our final sample is comprised of 1,029 loans. Panel B of Table 17 
describes this matching procedure. 
We obtain covenant information for the loan sample from Dealscan. Dealscan provides 
information regarding several types of covenants – event-induced, financial, dividend restriction, 
and secured loan.
39
  The event-induced covenants force the loan retirement early if the firm sells a 
pre-specified amount of assets or issues a pre-specified level of new equity or debt. The financial 
ratio covenants can result in fines or force loan retirement if the firm breaches certain limits 
imposed by the bank on various types of accounting ratios.  The dividend restriction covenant can 
limit the ability of the firm to pay out dividends during the life of the loan if certain criteria are 
not met. Finally, the secured loan covenant requires that the loan be secured by the assets of the 
borrowing firm. 
For the analysis of covenant intensity, we follow the approach in Bradley and Roberts 
(2004). We create a set of dummy variables whose values are equal to one for each of the 
following cases: if a given loan has two or more financial ratio covenants (ratiodummy), an asset 
(asweep), debt (dsweep), or equity (esweep) sweep covenant, a dividend restriction covenant 
(divrest), and if the loan is secured (secured). We then sum these six dummy variables to obtain 
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 See Bradley and Roberts (2004) for a detailed explanation of Dealscan covenant data. 
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the measure of covenant intensity, Covintensity, which can range in value from 0 to 6. A detailed 
description of the covenant distribution on the loans in our sample is in Table 18. 
Loans made to firms can come from either a single lender or a syndicate of lenders 
(relationship and arms-length lending, respectively). A syndicated loan is made by a group of 
lenders (termed a syndicate) to provide funds to a particular borrower. Similar to an IPO, a 
syndicated loan can be fully underwritten, where the loan is syndicated after an arranging bank 
guarantees the entire amount, or partially underwritten (“best efforts”). A lead bank (also known 
as the “arranger”) typically assumes a larger proportion of the loan than do other syndicate 
members and has the task of distributing the loan’s cash flows to those members. Syndicate 




The transition to syndicated loans is an important consideration in this analysis. Carey 
(1998) finds that covenant use is greater the more widely the loan is syndicated. Rajan and 
Winton (1995) note that as covenants encourage monitoring, the inherent free-rider problem in 
monitoring firms with syndicated loans requires the use of more strict covenants.
 41
 In addition, 
the finding of Drucker and Puri (2006) that covenants are more restrictive when loans are 
expected to be sold also could indicate that covenant intensity on syndicated loans is greater. 
We consider whether or not the loan is syndicated and the average number of lenders on 
the loan.  Before IPO, 42% of the loans made to the IPO firms are syndicated (with an average of 
1.8 lenders), and this percentage increases to 71% after IPO (with an average of 2.9 lenders).  
Thus, the IPO significantly increases the extent of loan syndication – after the IPO, firms become 
more likely to rely on arms-length financing rather than borrow from a single lender.  In order to 
better test the possible effects of syndication, we categorize the sample of IPO firms into four 
groups, using the loans closest to the IPO (both before and after) to determine the type of the 
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 For a detailed description of the syndicated loan process, see Chew and Watters (2011). 
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 Rajan and Winton (1995) note that covenants have the ability to encourage bank monitoring as detection 
of covenant breach can occur only if the bank has conducted at least a minimum amount of monitoring. 
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firm: firms having non-syndicated loans before and after their IPOs (NN), firms with non-
syndicated pre-IPO loans and syndicated post-IPO loans (NS), firms with syndicated pre-IPO 
loans and non-syndicated post-IPO loans (SN), and firms with syndicated loans both before and 
after IPO (SS).  Table 19 provides the distribution of the number of cases, by IPO year, for each 
of the four transition types.  
Table 20 provides summary statistics for our sample firms and loans both before and after 
IPO. Firm-specific accounting data per loan-year is obtained from COMPUSTAT.  The sample 
firms are not highly levered before their IPOs, and as expected, given that issuing equity is a 
leverage-decreasing event, their mean leverage declines slightly post-IPO. In considering the 
possibility for venture capitalist backing, we find that 54% of the firms are VC-backed at the time 
of their IPOs. Covenant intensity increases from an average pre-IPO value of 2.13 to 2.39 post-
IPO. Loan yields, defined as the yield in basis points on the firm’s loan over the 6-month LIBOR, 
decline post-IPO, moving from 273bp to 223bp. The average loan amount increases from $64 
million pre-IPO to $124 million post-IPO. The average loan maturity increases from 37 months 
before IPO to 41 months after IPO. 
Table 21 provides summary statistics of firm (Panel A) and loan (Panel B) characteristics 
by the type of loan transition and provides tests for differences in characteristics between types. 
Overall, we see in Panel A that Type NN firms are significantly smaller (as measured by assets) 
than all other firm types. Type SS firms are significantly more levered than are Type NN and NS 
firms and are older and larger than all other firm types. In Panel B, we find that there are 
significant differences in loan size and maturity between the types both before and after IPO. 
Loan size increases after IPO for all but Type SN firms and loan maturity significantly increases 
(decreases) for Type NS (SN) firms after IPO. Type SS firms take significantly larger loans of 





4.3.1. Univariate analysis of covenant intensity and loan yield 
We first examine the changes in covenant intensity around IPOs. Table 22 provides the 
univariate comparisons (using both mean and median) for the closest pre- and post-loans. For the 
overall sample, we find a significant increase in both mean and median covenant intensity around 
the IPO. The average covenant intensity increases from 2.13 to 2.39. When splitting the overall 
sample into the transition types described above, we find a highly significant increase (1.74 to 
2.46) in covenant intensity only for NS firms – those switching from non-syndicated pre-IPO 
loans to syndicated post-IPO loans. Thus, we find evidence in support of greater covenant use in 
syndicated loans.   
Table 23 provides the univariate comparisons for loan yields. For the overall sample, we 
find a significant decrease in both mean and median loan yield after the IPO. The average loan 
yield decreases from 273bp to 223bp. When splitting the overall sample into the loan transition 
types, we find highly significant decreases in loan yield of 51bp, 68bp, and 35bp for the NN, NS, 
and SS types, respectively.  
Overall, we find some preliminary evidence to suggest that the IPO can play both a direct 
role and an indirect one (through its potential impact on syndicated loan use) in determining 
covenant intensity and loan yields. We further explore these relationships in the multivariate 
analysis. 
4.3.2. Multivariate analysis of covenant intensity and loan yields 
 
In order to test the relationship between covenant intensity and the IPO, we estimate the 



















                (9) 
                                                          
42
 Since the Type SN subsample has very few observations, to maintain comparability between the overall 
sample results and those of the subsamples, we omit the observations for Type SN firms from the overall 
sample results.  
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Control variables are LoanSize, PostIPO*LoanSize, Maturity, FirmSize, Leverage, and 
ZScore, each as defined in Appendix 3. In addition, Fama-French industry (Industry) and year 
(Year) dummy variables are included to capture industry and year fixed effects, respectively.
43
 As 
Covintensity is a count variable, we also estimate Eq. (9) using Poisson regression.
44
 The overall 
sample results of both approaches are provided in specifications (1) and (5), respectively, in Panel 
A of Table 24.  
For the overall sample, we find a significantly negative coefficient estimate on PostIPO, 
indicative of lower covenant intensity after a firm’s IPO. As expected, there is a positive 
relationship between covenant intensity and each of the loan’s maturity and size and the firm’s 
leverage, and a negative relationship between covenant intensity and firm size (as proxied by firm 
assets). Given the significant differences in covenant intensity found in the univariate analysis 
based on loan transition type, we run Eq. (9) for each of the Type NN, NS, and SS subsamples 
using OLS and Poisson specifications. We report these results in specifications (2) through (4) (as 
well as (6) through (8)) in Panel A of Table 24. The coefficient estimate on the PostIPO variable 
is negative and significant for NN firms, while it is insignificant for NS (in the Poisson 
specification) and SS firms. Thus, firms with syndicated loans after their IPOs experience no 
significant change in the covenant intensity of their loans, while firms that continue to use non-
syndicated loans after IPO experience significant decreases in covenant intensity.  
The lower post-IPO covenant intensity just observed is inconsistent with the significant 
increase found in the univariate tests. Upon further examination, we find that this inconsistency 
can be explained by two factors. First, as shown in Panel B of Table 21, loan size and maturity 
increase significantly after a firm’s IPO, especially for Type NS firms. Given the positive and 
significant relationship between loan size (and maturity) and covenant intensity observed above, 
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 Since loan size is found in Table 20 to significantly increase after IPO, we include the interaction term 
PostIPO*LoanSize as a control variable. Thus, we allow for the possibility that the slope of the relationship 
between loan size and covenant intensity changes after IPO. 
44
 For additional details regarding model estimation using count data, refer to Appendix 4. 
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the increased loan size leads to greater post-IPO covenant intensity. Second, as documented by 
Bradley and Roberts (2004), there is a general upward trend in covenant intensity over the 1993 
to 2001 period.  Thus, the measure of covenant intensity, as described above, has an upward trend 
over time even in the absence of an IPO. The combination of these two factors results in the 
observed increase in covenant intensity after IPO at the univariate level. However, once these 
effects are controlled for in the multivariate setting (using LoanSize, PostIPO*LoanSize, and year 
dummies), we observe that the IPO itself results in lower covenant intensity.  
Next, we conduct the same analysis as in Eq. (9) but change the dependent variable to 
loan yield, Yield.  The results of estimating Eq. (9) are provided in specification (1) in Panel B of 
Table 24. For the overall sample, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate on the 
PostIPO variable, indicating that firms experience a decline of 33bp, on average, in loan yield 
after their IPOs. We find a negative and significant relationship between loan yield and each of 
loan size, firm size, and z-score, while loan yield is significantly positively related to leverage. 
We further conduct subsample analysis based on types NN, NS, and SS and the results 
are provided in specifications (2) through (4) in Panel B of Table 24. For Type NS and SS firms, 
the coefficient estimate of PostIPO variable is negative and significant, indicating that these firms 
experience a reduction in the yields on their loans after IPO, averaging 54bp and 36bp, 
respectively. Conversely, NN firms experience no significant declines in loan yield around IPO. 
In order to test whether there are significant differences among the types, we re-estimate 
Eq. (1) for the overall sample and use interaction terms of PostIPO with type indicator variables 






















      (10) 
Note that we have made Type NN firms the reference group for the above specification. The 
coefficient estimate of PostIPO reflects the change in covenant intensity for Type NN firms. The 
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coefficient estimates of PostIPO interacted with the Type NS and SS indicator variables reflect 
the differences in changes of covenant intensity between Type NN and Type NS and SS firms, 
respectively. The pre-IPO differences in covenant intensity between Type NN and Type NS and 
SS firms are reflected in the coefficient estimates of the indicator variables for Types NS and SS 
firms, respectively. The definitions of all right-hand-side variables are described in Appendix 3. 
We also estimate Eq. (10) using Poisson regression. The results of both approaches are provided 
in specifications (1) and (2), respectively, in Table 25.  
We find a significantly negative coefficient estimate on PostIPO, indicative of lower 
covenant intensity after a firm’s IPO for Type NN firms. Covenant intensity is also lower for 
Type SS firms after IPO since the difference from Type NN firms is insignificant.
45
 We, however, 
find no overall effect of the IPO for Type NS firms. The coefficient estimate on PostIPO*Type 
NS is positive and significant, indicating that the post-IPO covenant intensity for Type NS firms 
is significantly different from that of Type NN firms. The sum of the two coefficient estimates of 
PostIPO and PostIPO*Type NS is not significantly different from zero. Thus, firms switching to 
syndicated loans after their IPOs experience no change in the covenant intensity of their loans 
while firms continuing to use the same loan type after IPO experience significant decreases in 
covenant intensity.  
Next, we conduct the same analysis as in Eq. (10) but change the dependent variable to 
loan yield, Yield. The results are provided in specification (3) in Table 25. We find a negative but 
insignificant coefficient estimate on the PostIPO variable, indicating that Type NN firms 
experience little change in yields after IPO. Conversely, Types NS and SS firms experience 
declines, on average, of 52bp and 32bp, respectively, in the yields on the loans taken after IPO.
46
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 A formal test reveals that the sum of the coefficient estimates on PostIPO*SS and PostIPO is statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
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 A formal test reveals that the sum of the coefficient estimates on PostIPO*SS and PostIPO is statistically 
significantly different from zero (negative) at the 1% level. Also, a test of the sum of the coefficient 
estimates on PostIPO*NS and PostIPO indicates that the sum is statistically significantly different from 
zero (negative) at the 1% level. 
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Taking the results provided in Tables 24 and 25 together, we find that NN firms who 
have non-syndicated loans both before and after IPO experience a significant decline in the 
covenant intensity on their loans but have no significant change in loan yield around IPO. NS 
firms who have non-syndicated loans before IPO but who switch to syndicated loans after IPO 
have their loan yields reduced by 52bp but experience no change in covenant intensity after IPO. 
SS firms who have syndicated loans both before and after IPO experience a significant decline in 
loan yields (32bp) and covenant intensity after IPO. Thus, we find some evidence of a trade-off 
between covenant intensity and loan yields.  Moreover, we find evidence that the ability of the 
IPO to resolve the bank holdup problem as in Schenone (2010) is a function of loan syndication. 
Firms with non-syndicated loans after IPO do not experience a reduction in loan yields. 
 
4.4. The joint determination of covenant intensity and loan yields 
As the covenants on a loan and its yield are determined jointly based primarily on 
characteristics of the borrowing firm, covenant intensity and loan yields are likely to be 
endogenous. In order to account for this endogeneity, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimation of the two specifications of Eq. (9) used above for Covintensity and Yield.
47
 The 3SLS 
estimation approach requires the use of instrumental variables for each endogenous dependent 
variable of interest – namely, instruments for covenant intensity and yields. In practice, given the 
joint determination of covenants and yields at the time a loan is made, it is difficult to find 
instruments which are correlated with covenant usage but are only indirectly related to loan rates, 
and vice versa.  
Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) assert that a firm’s growth opportunities will have an 
influence on the covenants on its loans. They argue that high-growth firms can benefit from 
covenants to mitigate the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. Conversely, covenants 
may be more prevalent in low-growth firms as they are of lower cost. Mehran (1995) argues that 
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 The 3SLS method was proposed by Zellner and Theil (1962) and further details regarding this approach 
are provided in Appendix 4. 
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R&D can be a proxy for growth opportunities while Sorensen (2000) argues that capital 
expenditures can be a valid proxy. We thus use the following instruments for covenant intensity: 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to net sales (R&D) and the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales 
(Capsale). McAlister, Srinivasan and Kim (2007) find that a firm’s spending on advertising and 
R&D creates intangible assets insulating it from stock market changes and lowering its systematic 
risk. We argue that systematic risk is likely to influence yields and we thus use advertising 
(Adsale) and R&D expenditures, each scaled by sales, as instruments for yields. 
The results of the estimation of 3SLS are provided in Table 26. The dependent variables 
in specifications (1) and (2) are Covintensity and Yield, respectively. The coefficient estimate of 
PostIPO in specification (1) is negative and significant, indicating that even when controlling for 
loan yield, covenant intensity declines after IPO. The coefficient estimate of PostIPO in 
specification (2) is also negative and significant – when controlling for covenant intensity, loan 
yields decline after IPO. Taken together, these two results provide evidence of the informational 
effect of the IPO on loan terms and that there is a trade-off between covenant intensity and loan 
yields. 
 
4.5. The effect of lender switching on covenant intensity and loan yields 
As discussed in Section 4.3, some firms in the sample change loan syndication type after 
their IPOs and some do not. We examine whether these firms continue to use the same lenders 
and the impact that has on the covenants placed on their loans and the loan yields they are 
charged. In order to do so, we obtain from Dealscan the identity of the lenders on each of the 
loans pre- and post-IPO and create a dummy variable (SameLender) equal to one if the firm’s 
lenders remain unchanged, and zero if the firm switches lenders. If the loan is syndicated, we 
consider the firm to be using the same lenders if the lead bank and top five participants remain the 
same for the first loan after the IPO. In the sample, there are 137 firms having the same lender 
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and loan type before and after IPO, of which 69 are using non-syndicated lenders and 68 are 
using syndicated lenders.  
In order to determine the effect of using the same lender, we estimate the following 


















       (11) 
The PostIPO coefficient estimate reflects the change in covenant intensity around IPO for firms 
switching lenders. We estimate Eq. (11) using both OLS and Poisson regression and the results 
are provided in Panel A of Table 27.  
For the overall sample using Poisson regression, the PostIPO coefficient estimate is 
negative and significant, while that for PostIPO*SameLender is insignificant, indicating that the 
change in covenant intensity is not significantly different between firms that switch lenders and 
those that do not. When considering NN firms, the coefficient estimate on PostIPO is negative 
and significant for firms switching lenders. Conversely, NN firms maintaining the same lender 
experience a significantly smaller reduction in covenant intensity on their post-IPO loans.
48
 This 
finding is not surprising since firms that maintained the same lenders had lower covenant 
intensity before IPO as compared to firms that switched lenders. In fact, our findings indicate that 
post-IPO covenant intensity for firms that switched lenders is about the same as that for firms 
maintaining the same lenders. In particular, the sum of the coefficient estimates of PostIPO, 




Conversely, when considering NS firms, the PostIPO coefficient estimate is negative and 
significant, while that for PostIPO*SameLender is insignificant, indicating that the change in 
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 We also test for the difference of the coefficient estimates on PostIPO*SameLender and PostIPO from 
zero and find that it is not significantly different from zero. 
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 A formal test reveals that the post-IPO difference between firms who switched lenders and those who 
maintained lenders (i.e. the sum of the coefficient estimates of PostIPO and PostIPO*SameLender) is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
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covenant intensity is not significantly different between firms that switch lenders and those that 
do not.  For Type SS firms, both the PostIPO and PostIPO*SameLender coefficient estimates are 
insignificant, indicating that there is no change in covenant intensity for Type SS firms either 
maintaining the same or switching lenders around IPO. 
We also consider the impact of switching lenders on loan yields by employing the 
approach outlined above, except the dependent variable is changed to Yield. The results are 
reported in Panel B of Table 27. For the overall sample, the coefficient estimate on PostIPO is 
negative and significant. The coefficient estimate of PostIPO*SameLender is insignificant, 
indicating that there is no significant difference in the change in yields for firms switching or 
maintaining the same lenders around IPO. When considering NN firms, we find no significant 
differences in loan yields charged to firms either keeping the same lenders or switching lenders. 
For Type NS firms, we find a statistically significant decline in yields for firms that switched 
lenders. The insignificant coefficient estimate on PostIPO*SameLender indicates that firms 
maintaining the same lenders experience a similar decline in yields. For Type SS firms, we find a 
negative and significant coefficient estimate on PostIPO. The coefficient estimate on 
PostIPO*SameLender is positive but insignificant, again indicating that there is no difference 
between firms that switched lenders and those that did not. Firms that switch lenders are able to 
have their loan yields reduced by 53bp and 43bp for Type NS and SS firms, respectively, on 
average. Overall, we find evidence that changing lenders around IPO leads to a bigger reduction 
in yields. 
 
4.6. The effect of venture capitalist backing on covenant intensity and loan yields 
In Table 20, we noted that approximately half of our IPO sample is comprised of firms 
backed by venture capitalists. As Gompers (1996) notes, VC backing can help mitigate 




 As well, since VCs play an active monitoring role in the companies in which they invest, 
banks may place fewer covenants on and/or reduce the yield on loans made to VC-backed IPO 
firms. This potential ‘VC effect’ can extend past the IPO until eventual VC exit. Thus, if VCs can 
reduce information asymmetry or lower the perceived risk of a borrowing firm, then there are 
likely to be significant differences between the venture-backed and non-venture backed firms.   
In order to determine the effect of VC backing, we follow a similar approach as above, 
replacing the SameLender dummy variable with NonVC, a dummy variable equal to one if a firm 
is not VC-backed, and zero if it is. We then estimate the following equation for the overall sample 


















     (12) 
The results are provided in Panel A of Table 28. For the overall sample, the coefficient estimate 
of PostIPO is negative and significant while that of PostIPO*NonVC is positive but insignificant. 
These findings suggest no significant differences between venture-backed and non-VC backed 
firms in terms of changes in covenant intensity around IPO. Similar results hold for NN firms. 
For NS firms, we find a significantly larger increase in covenant intensity for non-VC backed 
firms when compared to VC-backed firms. 
In order to examine the effect of venture backing on loan yields, we repeat the above 
analysis using Yield as the dependent variable. The results are in Panel B of Table 28. For the 
overall sample, we find a significant decline in yields (42bp, on average) for VC-backed firms. 
The coefficient estimate on PostIPO*NonVC is positive, suggesting a smaller decline in yields for 
those firms, and the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant. It is interesting to note that 
non-VC backed firms had lower yields pre-IPO and that post-IPO yields are approximately the 
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 See, for example, Black and Gilson (1998) for a comprehensive analysis of the role of venture capitalist 
backing of IPOs. 
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same. In particular, the sum of the coefficient estimates of PostIPO, PostIPO*NonVC, and 
NonVC equals -41.683, similar to the coefficient estimate of PostIPO (-42.501).
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Similar findings apply to Type NS and SS firms. The notable difference here is that non-
VC backed firms experience significantly smaller declines in yields, especially for Type NS 
firms. For NN firms, it is only the non-VC backed subsample firms which experience a 
significant reduction in loan yields after IPO. It should be noted, however, that for this type, non-
VC backed firms had significantly higher yields pre-IPO. These results indicate that the observed 
decline in loan yields is a function of venture capitalist backing, along with the IPO itself. 
Taking Panels A and B of Table 28 together, we find that venture-backed NN firms who 
have non-syndicated loans both before and after IPO experience reductions in covenant intensity 
but no significant changes in yields. Venture-backed NS firms who have non-syndicated loans 
before IPO but who switch to syndicated loans after IPO have their loan yields reduced but 
experience no significant change in covenant intensity. Venture-backed Type SS firms who have 
syndicated loans both before and after IPO experience significant reductions in yields after IPO. 
Thus, we find that while the effect of venture capitalist backing is smaller for covenant intensity 
changes around IPO, it can have a significant influence on the loan yields charged to VC-backed 
firms. More specifically, we find evidence that the ability of the IPO to resolve the bank holdup 
problem is a function of VC backing – venture capitalists are able to mitigate the holdup problem 
for some firms (e.g. Type NN firms). 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine covenant changes on loans around 
IPO and link these changes to changing lending arrangements. The IPO provides an ideal test for 
examining the influence of changing asymmetric information on covenants and yields. We show 
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 A formal test reveals that the post-IPO difference between VC and non-VC backed firms (i.e. the sum of 
the coefficient estimates of PostIPO and PostIPO*NonVC) is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. 
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that both covenant intensity and loan yields decrease after the IPO. This evidence is consistent 
with the reduction in information asymmetry surrounding the IPO and the resulting changes in 
lending arrangements. 
We also provide evidence regarding the post-IPO switch to syndicated loans. First, the 
IPO brings about an increase in the extent of syndication, from 44% of pre-IPO loans to 84% 
post-IPO. Second, these changes have influence on covenants and yields. Firms having non-
syndicated loans both pre- and post-IPO experience a decrease in covenant intensity without 
achieving a decline in yields. In contrast, firms that move from using non-syndicated pre-IPO 
loans to syndicated loans after the IPO experience a substantial decline in yields along with a 
significant increase in covenant usage. 
The paper also contributes to the small literature on the joint determination of covenants 
and yields. As the covenants on a loan and its yield are determined jointly based primarily on 
characteristics of the borrowing firm, covenant intensity and loan yields are likely to be 
endogenous. In addition, the research on lending around IPO is relatively new and has so far 
focused on one variable of interest at a time. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to jointly 




Agrawal, A., Knoeber, C.R., 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 31 (3), 377-397. 
Amemiya, T., 1974. The nonlinear two-stage least-squares estimator. Journal of Econometrics 2, 
105-110. 
Anderson, R., Reeb, D., 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from 
the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1328. 
Anderson, R., Duru, A., Reeb, D., 2009. Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United 
States. Journal of Financial Economics 92, 205-222. 
Barclay, M.J., Holderness, C.G., 1989. Private benefits from control of public corporations. 
Journal of Financial Economics 25, 371-395.  
Bennedsen, M., Wolfenzon, D., 2000. The balance of power in closely held corporations. Journal 
of Financial Economics 58, 113-140. 
Bernardo, A.E., Chowdhry, B., 2002.  Resources, real options, and corporate strategy. Journal of 
Financial Economics 63 (2), 211-234. 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., 2001. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals 
are. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 901-932. 
Berry, C.B., Mann, S.C., Mihov, V., Rodriguez, M., 2009. Interest rate changes and the timing of 
debt issues. Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 600-608. 
Bethel, J. E., Liebeskind, J. P. and Opler, T., 1998. Block share purchases and corporate 
performance. Journal of Finance 53, 605-634. 
Bharat, S., Jayaraman, S., Nagar, V., 2011. Exit as goverance: an empirical analysis. Working 
paper, Arizona State University. 
Billett, M.T., King, T.H.D., Mauer, D.C., 2007. Growth opportunities and the choice of leverage, 
debt maturity, and covenants. Journal of Finance 62 (2), 697-730. 
59 
Black, B.S., Gilson, R.J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus 
stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics 47 (3), 243-277. 
Bloch, F., Hege, U., 2001. Multiple shareholders and control contests. Working Paper. 
Bowden, R.J., Turkington, D.A., 1984. Instrumental variables. Cambridge University Press. 
Bradley, M., Roberts, M.R., 2004. The structure and pricing of corporate debt covenants. 
Working Paper, Duke University. 
Brickley, J., Lease, R., Smith, C., 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover 
amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267-292. 
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K., 1998. Regression analysis of count data. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Carey, M., Post, M., Sharpe, S.A., 1998. Does corporate lending by banks and finance companies 
differ? Evidence on specialization in private debt contracting. Journal of Finance 53 (3), 
845-878. 
Chava, S., Kumar, P., Warga, A., 2004. Agency costs and the pricing of bond covenants. 
Working Paper, University of Houston.  
Chen, X., Harford, J., Li, K., 2007. ‘Monitoring: which institutions matter?’ Journal of Financial 
Economics 86, 279-305. 
Chew, W., Watters, P., 2011. A guide to the loan market. Standard & Poor’s Financial Services 
LLC – McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Available at  
            https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf. Accessed online February 15, 
2012. 
Cho, M.H., 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an empirical 
analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121. 
Chung, K.H., Zhang, H., 2011. Corporate governance and institutional ownership. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming. 
 
60 
Coles, J.L., Lemmon, M.L., Meschke, J.F., 2012. Structural models and endogeneity in corporate 
finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 103, 149-168. 
Connelly, B.L., Tihanyi, L., Certo, S.T., Hitt, M.A., 2010. Marching to the beat of different 
drummers: the influence of institutional owners on competitive actions. Academy of 
Management Journal 53, 723-742. 
Cronqvist, H., Fahlenbrach, R.M., 2009. Large shareholders and corporate policies. Review of 
Financial Studies 22, 3941-3976. 
Davidson, R., MacKinnon, J.G., 1993. Estimation and inference in econometrics. Oxford 
University Press. 
Davis, G.F., Kim, E.H., 2007. Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds. Journal of 
Financial Economics 85 (2), 552-570. 
Demiroglu, C., James, C.M., 2010. The information content of bank loan covenants. Review of 
Financial Studies 23 (10), 3700-3737. 
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. 
Journal of Political Economy 93 (6), 1155-1177. 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 7 (3), 209-233. 
Dlugosz, J., Fahlenbrach, R., Gompers, P., Metrick, A., 2006. Large blocks of stock: prevalence, 
size, and measurement. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (3), 594-618. 
Dobrzynski, J., 1993. Relationship investing: A new shareholder is emerging — patient and 
involved. Business Week 3309 (March 15), 68-75. 
Drucker, S., Puri, M., 2006. On loan sales, loan contracting, and lending relationships. Working 
Paper, Columbia University. 
Fahlenbrach, R.M., 2009. Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation. Review of Finance 
13 (1), 81-113. 
61 
Fahlenbrach, R.M., Stulz, R., 2009. Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value. Journal of 
Financial Economics 92 (3), 342-361. 
Fama, E.F., 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88 
(2), 288-307.  
Gilson, S., 1990. Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 
26, 355-387. 
Gompers, P., 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial Economics 
42, 133-156. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2010. Extreme governance: an analysis of dual-class firms in 
the United States. Review of Financial Studies 23 (3), 1051-1088. 
Goyal, V.K., 2005. Market discipline of bank risk: evidence from subordinated debt contracts. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 14, 318-350. 
Grabowski, H.G., Mueller, D.C., 1975. Life-cycle effects on corporate returns on retentions. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 57 (4), 400-409. 
Graves, S., Waddock, S., 1990. Institutional ownership and control: implications for long-term 
corporate strategy. Academy of Management Executive 4, 75-83. 
Greene, W.H., 2007. Functional form and heterogeneity in models for count data. Available 
online: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/greenefunctionalform.pdf. Retrieved February 
10, 2012. 
Gujarati, D., 2011. Econometrics by example. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hermalin, B., Weisbach, M., 1991. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on 
firm performance. Financial Management 20 (4), 101-112. 
Himmelberg, C.P., Hubbard, R.G., Palia, D., 1999. Understanding the determinants of managerial 
ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 53 (3), 353-384. 
62 
Holderness, C.G., 2009. The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States. Review of Financial 
Studies 22, 1377-1408. 
Holderness, C.G., Kroszner, R.S., Sheehan, D.P., 1999. Were the good old days that good? 
Changes in managerial stock ownership since the Great Depression. Journal of Finance 
54 (2), 435-469. 
Holderness, C.G., Sheehan, D.P., 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held 
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 317-346. 
Hong, H., Lim, T., Stein, J.C., 2000. Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst coverage, and the 
profitability of momentum. Journal of Finance 55 (1), 265-295. 
Jacobs, M., 1991. Short-term America: the causes and cures of our business myopia. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Johnson, W. B., McGee, R. P., Nagarajan, N. J. Newman, H. A., and Schwert, G. W., 1985. An 
analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths: Implications for the 
managerial labor market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 1, 151-178. 
Kelejian, H.H., 1971. Two-stage least squares and econometric systems linear in parameters but 
nonlinear in the endogenous variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
66, 373-374. 
Kim, E.H., Lu, Y., 2011. CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking. Journal of 
Financial Economics 102 (2), 272-292. 
King, G., 1988. Statistical models for political science event counts: bias in conventional 
procedures and evidence for the exponential Poisson regression model. American Journal 
of Political Science 32 (3), 838-863. 
Kole, S.R., 1995. Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership 
data. Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 413-435. 
63 
Konijn, S., Kraussl, R., Lucas, A., 2011. Blockholder dispersion and firm value. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 17 (5), 1330-1339. 
Laeven, L., Levine, R., 2008. Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of 
Financial Studies 21 (2), 579-604. 
Laverty, K., 1996. Economic "short-termism": the debate, the unresolved issues, and the 
implications for management practice and research. Academy of Management Review 
21, 825-860. 
Li, F., Srinivasan, S., 2011. Corporate governance when founders are directors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 102, 454-469. 
Long, J.S., 1997. Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Sage 
Publications. 
Maury, B., Pajuste, A., 2005. Multiple large shareholders and firm value. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 29, 1813-1834. 
McAlister, L., Srinivasan, R., Kim, M.C., 2007. Advertising, research and development and 
systematic risk of the firm. Journal of Marketing 71 (1), 35-48. 
McConnell, J., Lins, K., Servaes, H., 2008. Changes in insider ownership and changes in the 
market value of the firm. Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 92-106. 
McConnell, J., Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. 
Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612. 
McConnell, J., Servaes, H., 1995. Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of 
Financial Economics 39, 131-157. 
Mehran, H., 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal 
of Financial Economics 38, 163-184. 
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R.H., Cannella, A.A., 2007. Are family firms really 
superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance 13, 829-858. 
64 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315. 
Mueller, D.C., 1972. A life cycle theory of the firm. Journal of Industrial Economics 20 (3), 199-
219. 
Mullahy, J., 1997. Heterogeneity, excess zeros, and the structure of count data models. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 12, 337-350. 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., Zingales, L., 1998. Why do companies go public? An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Finance 53, 24-64. 
Pagano, M., Röell, A., 1998. The choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, monitoring, 
and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1), 187-225. 
Palia, D., Ravid, A., 2002. The role of founders in large companies: entrenchment or valuable 
human capital. Working paper, Rutgers University. 
Parrino, R., Sias, R., Starks, L., 2003. Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes 
around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 3-46. 
Porter, M., 1992. Capital choices: changing the way America invests in industry. Boston: Council 
on Competitiveness/Harvard Business School. 
Rajan, R., Winton, A., 1995. Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. Journal of 
Finance 50 (4), 1113-1146. 
Reisel, N., 2004. On the value of restrictive covenants: an empirical investigation of public bond 
issues. Working paper, Rutgers University. 
Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J.G., 1997. Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth. 
Journal of Financial Economics 44 (2), 229-250. 
Schenone, C., 2010. Lending relationships and information rents: do banks exploit their 
information advantages? Review of Financial Studies 23 (3), 1149-1199. 
Slovin, M., Sushka, M., 1993. Ownership concentration, corporate control activity, and firm 
value: evidence from the death of inside blockholders. Journal of Finance 48, 1293-1321. 
65 
Sorensen, D., 2000. Characteristics of merging firms. Journal of Economics and Business 52, 
423-433. 
Stock, J.H., Watson, M.W., 2003. Introduction to econometrics. Addison-Wesley, 328-329. 
Stulz, R., 1988. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for 
corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-54. 
Sunder, J., 2004. Information production in stock markets and cost of bank debt. Working Paper, 
Northwestern University. 
Theil, H., 1971. Principles of econometrics. John Wiley and Sons, 508-527. 
Villalonga, B., Amit, R., 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm 
value? Journal of Financial Economics 80, 385-417. 
Villalonga, B., Amit, R., 2009. How are U.S. family firms controlled? Review of Financial 
Studies 22 (8), 3047-3091. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT Press. 
Zellner, A., 1962. An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for 
aggregation bias. Journal of American Statistics Association 58, 977-992. 
Zellner, A., Theil, H., 1962. Three-stage least squares: simultaneous estimation of simultaneous 
equations. Econometrica 30, 54-78. 
Zhou, X., 2001. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between 










 Dependent variable 
  
Tobin’s q The ratio of book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the 
book value of equity to the book value of assets 
  
 Ownership variables 
  
Largest individual ownership The percentage of voting rights controlled by the largest individual 
blockholder  
Largest individual wedge The difference between the percentage of voting and cash flow rights 
controlled by the largest individual blockholder 
Second Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has a second 
individual blockholder in the top three, and zero otherwise 
Corporate Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has a corporate 
blockholder in the top three, and zero otherwise 
NonFamily Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the largest individual 
blockholder is not a founder, and zero otherwise 
2NonFamily Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the second blockholder is 
not a founder, and zero otherwise 
  
 Control and instrumental variables 
  
Firm size The book value of total assets 
Leverage The ratio of book value of long term debt to total assets 
Sales growth The percentage change in sales over the previous year 
R&D The ratio of R&D to firm sales 
Delaware Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a firm is incorporated in 
Delaware, and zero otherwise 
Diversification Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a firm reports more than 
one segment, and zero otherwise 
VC Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is backed by a 
venture capitalist, and zero otherwise 
Sales / Regional sales The ratio of a firm’s sales to the sales of all firms in the same region (as 
defined by the micropolitan or metropolitan statistical area (MSA)) 
%Sales The percentage of all Compustat sales by firms located in the same MSA 











 Dependent variable 
  
Tobin’s q The ratio of book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book 
value of equity to the book value of assets 
  
 Ownership variables 
  
Insider own The percentage of voting rights controlled by the insider blockholders  
Insider wedge The difference between the percentage of voting and cashflow rights controlled 
by the insider blockholders 
Outsider Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has at least one outsider 
individual blockholder, and zero otherwise 
Corporate Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has a corporate 
blockholder, and zero otherwise 
  
 Control and instrumental variables 
  
Firm size The book value of total assets 
Firm age The number of years since CRSP listing 
Leverage The ratio of book value of long term debt to total assets 
Sales growth The percentage change in sales over the previous year 
R&D The ratio of R&D to firm sales 
Delaware Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a firm is incorporated in 
Delaware, and zero otherwise 
Diversification Dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a firm reports more than one 
segment, and zero otherwise 
Sales / Regional sales The ratio of a firm’s sales to the sales of all firms in the same region (as defined 
by the micropolitan or metropolitan statistical area (MSA)) 














  Dependent variables 
  
Covintensity Sum of the dummy variables indicating the presence of each of the following: 
two or more financial ratio covenants, asset sweep, debt sweep, equity sweep, 
dividend restriction, and secured loan covenants 
Yield Dealscan yield in basis points on the firm’s loan over the 6-month LIBOR 
  
  Independent variables and subsample types 
  
PostIPO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan occurs after the IPO 
Type NN Firms having non-syndicated loans before and after their IPOs  
Type NS Firms having non-syndicated loans before and syndicated loans after their IPOs  
Type SN Firms having syndicated loans before and non-syndicated loans after their IPOs  
Type SS Firms having syndicated loans before and after their IPOs 
SameLender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm uses the same lender after its IPO 
NonVC Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is not venture-backed 
  
  Control and instrumental variables 
  
Maturity Natural log of loan maturity measured in months 
LoanSize Natural log of loan amount measured in $ millions 
FirmSize Natural log of firm's assets measured in $ millions 
Leverage Ratio of book value of firm’s long-term debt to book value of assets 
ZScore Altman’s z-score (estimated for private firms) 
Capsale Ratio of the firm’s capital expenditures to sales 
R&D Ratio of the firm’s R&D expenditures to sales 
Adsale Ratio of the firm’s advertising expenditures to sales 
Year Dummies for each of loan years 1992 to 2008 











Essays #1 and #2 
 
Quadratic Specification 
 We employ a nonlinear specification to model the relationship between the ownership of 
the largest individual blockholder (total insider ownership) and firm value. We incorporate both a 


























    
(1) 
Using this approach, we are not forcing the relationship to be nonlinear (here, quadratic) but are 
merely allowing for the possibility. For example, it may be the case that increases in the 
ownership stake of the largest individual blockholder initially reduce firm value (increased 
private benefit extraction), but after a certain point, subsequent increases in ownership stake 
increase firm value (greater incentive alignment). Conversely, the opposite relationship may hold. 
We can estimate (1) using standard OLS.
52
 If the coefficient estimate of γ2 is insignificant 
and the coefficient estimate of γ1 is significantly negative or positive, the relationship is (likely to 
be) linear. The relationship is also linear for the cases where the coefficient estimates of γ1 and γ2 
are both significantly positive (or negative). If the coefficient estimate of γ1 is significantly 
negative and the coefficient estimate of γ2 is significantly positive, then there is a convex/U-
shaped relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value. 
Conversely, if the coefficient estimate of γ1 is significantly positive and the coefficient estimate of 
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 See, for example, Stock and Watson (2003). 
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The Endogeneity of Ownership 
 It can be argued that there exists an endogenous relationship between blockholder 
ownership and firm value. Namely, it can either be the case that greater ownership by 
individuals/insiders leads to higher firm value or that individuals/insiders hold greater stakes in 
firms of higher value. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) tests may be vulnerable to biases that arise 
from this potential endogeneity of ownership.  
 For endogeneity correction in traditional (linear) OLS specifications, the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach is generally used. However, given our quadratic specification of the 
relationship between the largest individual blockholder’s ownership and firm value, the 2SLS 
approach is likely to be inappropriate. Wooldridge (2002) notes that when a model is linear in 
parameters but nonlinear in endogenous variables the identification must be treated differently. In 
our case, if we were to regress ownership on our exogenous variables, saving the predicted values 
and squaring them, the second-stage regression would then regress Tobin’s q (the measure of firm 
value) on predicted ownership, squared predicted ownership, and the instruments. This approach 
would lead to inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters. Thus, the use of traditional 
2SLS when an endogenous variable is nonlinear leads to inconsistent estimators. Wooldridge 
(2002) calls the attempt to mimic 2SLS by substituting fitted values for endogenous variables 
inside a nonlinear (in our case, quadratic) function a “forbidden regression.” He shows that both 
the conditional expectation of the linear projection and the linear projection operator do not pass 
through nonlinear functions and notes that the linear projection of the square is not equivalent to 
the square of the linear projection.  
 To circumvent this bias, we employ the nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS) 
approach suggested by Kelejian (1971) and Amemiya (1974). In N2SLS, the estimation is 
completed by regressing the endogenous variables (ownership and squared ownership) on the 
instrument set and using the fitted values of each in the main regression. For example, let Xi be 
71 
the ownership of the largest blockholder, X
2
i be the squared ownership, and Zi,j be the set of 
instruments. We run the following regressions:  
              
                
We obtain fitted values  ̂ and   ̂. We then run the following regression: 
         ̂           ̂           . 
Despite its name, the approach can be accomplished in one stage using modern econometric 
software. 
 For N2SLS, there is no specific approach for the choice of instrumental variables. 
However, Bowden and Turkington (1984) note that if the function being specified is nonlinear 
then using only linear forms of the exogenous variables will result in a poor specification. 
Bowden and Turkington (1984), Kelejian (1971), and Amemiya (1974) suggest the use of 
second- (or higher) order terms and cross-products, in addition to the linear terms of the 
exogenous variables, in order to better capture nonlinearities in the endogenous variables. 
Bowden and Turkington (1984) note that using even a quadratic-augmented instrument set greatly 
improves the performance of the N2SLS estimator. However, they also caution that too many 
instruments may cause a loss of degrees of freedom in finite samples.  
 
Instrumental Variables 
The main objective in any instrumental variable approach is to find instruments which are 
correlated with the endogenous regressor(s) while being uncorrelated with the error term. Thus, 
for our analysis, we need to find instruments which affect firm value only through their effect on 
the ownership of the largest individual blockholder. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) note that 
corporate fraud has recently been observed in large firms that are major regional employers and 
thus they suggest that private benefits of control are greater when there are fewer large firms in 
the same region. Therefore, we would expect that a greater ownership stake would be more 
72 
attractive in firms that are among the major employers in a region. In addition, Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2010) note that the greater is the firm’s proportion of all sales in the region, the 
greater will be the private benefits of control. Based on their arguments, we use the following 
instrumental variables: (1) %Sales – the percentage of all Compustat sales by firms located in the 
same metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area (MSA) as firm i in the year before firm i’s IPO, 
and (2) Sales/Regional sales – the ratio of a firm’s sales to the sales of all firms in the same 
region. We also include the squares and cross products of all control variables and instruments as 





One of the dependent variables of interest, Covintensity, is a count variable ranging in 
value from zero to six. Thus, it cannot take negative values and is bounded on the right at the 
value of 6. King (1988) notes that there are serious problems with using standard OLS on count 
data. First, OLS incorrectly assumes a linear relationship (which requires continuous data), 
potentially leading to the prediction of negative counts. Worse, though, is the implicit assumption 
that, for example, the difference between zero and one covenant is equivalent to the difference 
between five and six covenants. Second, King (1988) notes that using OLS regression on count 
data leads to inefficient and biased estimators, standard errors, and test statistics.  
A potential remedy is to use a Poisson specification as count variables often follow a 
Poisson distribution.
53
 The Poisson regression model is estimated using maximum likelihood. 
Gujarati (2011) notes that, for Poisson-distributed variables, the mean and variance are equal 
(also known as equidispersion). Gujarati (2011) indicates that when there is over- (under-) 
dispersion, where the variance exceeds (is less than) the mean, the estimates obtained under the 
Poisson regression model are still consistent but the standard errors are downward- (upward-) 
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 See, for example, Long (1997) and Gujarati (2011). 
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biased. The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients would therefore be overstated 
(understated). For the Covintensity measure, we observe the following statistics: 




            
Covintensity 1,029 2.258 1.717 0 6 
 
Thus, as the variance is greater than the mean, the Covintensity measure appears to be 
overdispersed.  
To overcome an overdispersion problem, a Negative Binomial regression model may be 
employed. The Negative Binomial probability distribution does not assume the equivalence of the 
mean and variance. In fact, it assumes that the variance is always larger than the mean. Gujarati 
(2011) thus argues that for count data, the Negative Binomial probability distribution is more 
suitable than a Poisson probability distribution. We also employ this approach and obtain 
equivalent coefficient estimates to those under the Poisson estimation. The equivalence indicates 
that the conditional mean of Covintensity is equal to its conditional variance and the estimated 
parameter alpha is zero. In this case, the Negative Binomial model reduces to the Poisson 
model.
54
 Thus, as the two methods lead to similar results, we report only the Poisson 
specifications. 
Another consideration for count data is the potential for an excess number of zeros 
compared to the frequency predicted by the Poisson model. Mullahy (1997) indicates that the 
underprediction of zero counts by the Poisson model is the result of unobserved heterogeneity. As 
a potential remedy, Greene (2007) notes that zero-inflated models, which adjust the Poisson or 
Negative Binomial distributions toward the zero outcome, can be used. Zero-inflated models nest 
different probability models for the zero and nonzero counts. 
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We observe the following statistics for our Covintensity measure:  
Covintensity Freq. Percent Cum. 
        
0 131 12.73 12.73 
1 295 28.67 41.4 
2 205 19.92 61.32 
3 197 19.14 80.47 
4 60 5.83 86.3 
5 59 5.73 92.03 
6 82 7.97 100 
        
Total 1,029 100   
 
The Covintensity measure does not appear to have a large number of zeros relative to other 
counts, indicating the excess zeros problem may not be a significant issue for our sample. In 
additional robustness testing, we employ the zero-inflated Poisson procedure in the estimation of 
Eq. (1) for Covintensity and find the results to be qualitatively similar to those using the 
traditional Poisson specification. Thus, excess zeros do not appear to be a problem for our data. 
 
Joint Estimation of Covenants and Yields 
As the covenants on a loan and its yield are determined jointly based primarily on 
characteristics of the borrowing firm, covenant intensity and loan yields are likely to be 
endogenous.  In order to account for this joint determination, we use a three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) estimation approach for simultaneous equations introduced in Zellner and Theil (1962).
55
 
The 3SLS approach is a combination of traditional two-stage least squares and the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) method developed by Zellner (1962). The former deals with the 
dependent regressors (as described above) while the latter deals with the correlation of errors 
across equations. When error terms are correlated across the equations, joint estimation leads to 
greater precision in regression coefficients. Thus, the main objective of the SUR method is to 
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increase parameter estimation precision in a given regression model by using the sample 
information of other regressions. Zellner and Theil (1962) developed the three-stage least squares 
estimator by jointly estimating the structural model coefficients, taking into account error-term 
correlation in the system equations.  Residuals from the 2SLS method are used to estimate the 












Figure 1 – The influence of the second individual blockholder 
This figure plots the estimated relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s q. It also plots that 


























Figure 2 – The influence of the identity of the largest individual blockholder 
This figure plots the estimated relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s q, for each of the 
cases where the largest blockholder is and is not the founder. The figure also plots the basic relationship in the presence of a second individual blockholder for 








































Figure 3 – The influence of the identity of the second individual blockholder 
This figure plots the estimated relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s q, for each of the 

































Figure 4 – The influence of a corporate blockholder 
This figure plots the estimated relationship between the ownership of the largest individual blockholder and firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s q, for the case 
where there is a second individual blockholder. The figure also plots the basic relationship in the presence of a corporate blockholder. It uses the parameters in 


































Table 1 – Sample distribution by IPO and post-IPO years 
Panel A: Sample distribution by the IPO year 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
      
Common stock issues 615 516 539 792 2,462 
Less 
     
units 91 108 86 122 407 
carve-outs 98 69 40 64 271 
LBOs 40 12 11 15 78 
financial  48 29 31 62 170 
foreign 10 4 19 27 60 
CRSP/Compustat not available  3 4 1 4 12 
unclear 1st day of trading 0 2 0 1 3 
roll-ups 0 0 2 11 13 
  
     




Panel B: Distribution of firm-years with available ownership and accounting data by post-IPO year 
 
      Post-IPO year       
IPO  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  Total 
                
1,442
56
  1,339 1,200 1,070 920 797 699 629 569 524 455 402 356  10,402 
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 Six of the 1,448 firms disappear from the sample before the first proxy date after IPO. No data is 
available for these firms. 
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Table 2 – Presence and ownership of individual and corporate blockholders 
The table reports presence as well as ownership of the largest and second individual blockholders as well as that of the largest corporate blockholder. The sample 
is split by the number of blocks present in the firm. Ownership is the percentage of voting rights controlled by the blockholder (as reported in the prospectuses 
and the subsequent proxy statements). Median ownership is reported in parentheses. 
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One or more corporate blocks 
3,397 
[32.66%] 
0 0 0  0 0 0  
0.181 
(0.131) 
           












 0 0 0  
0.141 
(0.107) 
           
Two or more individual and one 























           
  0.283 0.323 0.205  0.126 0.119 0.138  0.157 
TOTAL 10,402 (0.210) (0.256) (0.144)  (0.107) (0.097) (0.124)  (0.117) 
  [6,774] [4,459] [2,315]  [2,644] [1,668] [976]  [7,483] 
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Table 3 – Summary statistics 
All variables are as described in Appendix 1. Leverage is winsorized at 1. Tobin’s q is winsorized at 5. 
R&D is winsorized at 2. Sales growth is winsorized at the 99
th
 percentile. Panel A presents the summary 
statistics for the overall sample and Panel B provides summary statistics by ownership structure 
classification. Differences in mean between ownership structure types are reported for each variable, along 
with the significance of the two-sample t-tests for mean. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Mean Median 
   
Tobin’s q 2.271 1.808 
Largest individual own 0.184 0.106 
Largest individual wedge 0.016 0 
Ln(Firm size) 4.608 4.522 
Leverage 0.180 0.065 
Sales growth 0.365 0.168 
Delaware 0.582 1 
Diversification 0.883 1 
R&D 0.124 0.004 
Second 0.254 0 
Corporate 0.719 1 
VC backing 0.477 0 
NonFounder 0.571 1 
2NonFounder 0.906 1 








Panel B – Summary statistics by ownership structure classification 
 
  Firm size Leverage Sales growth Delaware Diversification R&D 
        
1 No blocks 4.732 0.175 1.333 0.597 0.861 0.153 
2 One or more corporate blocks 4.873 0.175 1.361 0.710 0.858 0.196 
3 One individual block 4.727 0.205 1.339 0.462 0.909 0.068 
4 One individual and one or more corporate blocks 4.771 0.193 1.369 0.564 0.881 0.102 
5 Two or more individual blocks 3.842 0.156 1.409 0.455 0.911 0.060 
6 Two or more individual and one or more corporate blocks 4.250 0.164 1.349 0.540 0.899 0.107 
        
 Differences       
 1 less 2 -0.141 0.000 -0.028 -0.112*** 0.003** -0.043** 
 1 less 3 0.005 -0.030** -0.007 0.135*** -0.047*** 0.085*** 
 1 less 4 -0.039 -0.018 -0.036 0.033 -0.020 0.051*** 
 1 less 5 0.890 0.019** -0.076 0.143*** -0.050*** 0.094*** 
 1 less 6 0.482 0.011* -0.016 0.057 -0.037 0.046*** 
 2 less 3 0.145 -0.030*** 0.021 0.248*** -0.051*** 0.128*** 
 2 less 4 0.102 -0.018*** -0.008 0.146*** -0.023*** 0.094*** 
 2 less 5 1.030 0.019*** -0.048* 0.255*** -0.053*** 0.136*** 
 2 less 6 0.623 0.011*** 0.012 0.169*** -0.040*** 0.089*** 
 3 less 4 -0.044 0.012*** -0.029 -0.102*** 0.028*** -0.034*** 
 3 less 5 0.885 0.049 -0.069* 0.007 -0.003 0.008 
 3 less 6 0.478 0.041 -0.009 -0.078*** 0.010*** -0.039*** 
 4 less 5 0.929 0.037*** -0.040 0.109*** -0.030*** 0.042*** 
 4 less 6 0.521 0.029 0.020 0.024 -0.017 -0.005 
 5 less 6 -0.407 -0.008 0.060* -0.086*** 0.013*** -0.047*** 
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Table 4 – The influence of the largest individual blockholder on firm value 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. All independent variables are as 
defined in Appendix 1. The dependent variable is winsorized at 5. Regression results reported in column 2 
are estimated using non-linear two-stage least squares (N2SLS). The instruments include the squares and 
cross products of exogenous variables and the following instruments: Sales / Regional sales and %Sales. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS N2SLS 
   
Largest individual own -0.349 -5.487 
 (2.19)** (5.90)*** 
Largest individual own
2
 1.054 6.115 
 (4.61)*** (4.36)*** 
Largest individual wedge -0.731 1.133 
 (4.57)*** (1.28) 
   
Control variables   
Ln(Firm size) -0.043 -0.090 
 (4.11)*** (7.19)*** 
Leverage -0.721 -0.788 
 (10.50)*** (12.71)*** 
Sales growth 0.239 0.245 
 (14.03)*** (15.50)*** 
Delaware 0.070 -0.043 
 (2.80)*** (1.39) 
Diversification -0.190 -0.161 
 (4.26)*** (3.55)*** 
R&D 0.268 0.085 
 (4.07)*** (1.26) 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
Constant 2.027 2.424 
 (5.60)*** (13.17)*** 
   
Observations 9929 9854 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24  












Table 5 – The influence of an additional individual blockholder on the ownership-firm value 
relationship 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. All independent variables are as 
defined in Appendix 1. The dependent variable is winsorized at 5. Regression results reported in column 2 
are estimated using non-linear two-stage least squares (N2SLS). The instruments include the squares and 
cross products of exogenous variables and the following instruments: Sales / Regional sales and %Sales. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS N2SLS 
   
Largest individual own -0.362 -4.511 
 (2.01)** (3.96)*** 
Largest individual own
2
 0.998 5.035 
 (3.92)*** (3.18)*** 
Largest individual wedge -0.705 1.129 
 (4.39)*** (1.24) 
Largest individual own*Second -1.492 -9.132 
 (2.46)** (1.86)* 
Largest individual own
2
*Second 2.598 12.152 
 (3.05)*** (1.63) 
Second 0.192 1.127 
 (2.20)** (1.65)* 
   
Control variables   
Ln(Firm size) -0.041 -0.090 
 (3.82)*** (5.68)*** 
Leverage -0.719 -0.777 
 (10.47)*** (12.39)*** 
Sales growth 0.239 0.246 
 (14.04)*** (15.42)*** 
Delaware 0.068 -0.037 
 (2.73)*** (1.18) 
Diversification -0.187 -0.154 
 (4.19)*** (3.27)*** 
R&D 0.271 0.101 
 (4.11)*** (1.46) 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
Constant 1.621 2.403 
 (13.73)*** (12.09)*** 
   
Observations 9929 9854 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24  










Table 6 – Robustness tests 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q and all independent variables are as defined in Appendix 1. Regression 
results reported in column 2 are estimated using ownership of the largest insider blockholder and the 
interactions thereof. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS OLS 
   
Largest individual own -0.606 -0.362 
 (3.50)*** (2.01)** 
Largest individual own
2
 1.434 0.998 
 (5.88)*** (3.92)*** 
Largest individual wedge -0.829 -0.705 
 (5.11)*** (4.39)*** 
Largest individual own*VC 1.125  
 (3.40)***  
Largest individual own
2
*VC -1.208  
 (1.75)*  
VC 0.002  
 (0.05)  
Largest insider own*Second  -1.492 
  (2.46)** 
Largest insider own
2
*Second  2.598 
  (3.05)*** 
Second  0.192 
  (2.20)** 
Control variables   
Ln(Firm size) -0.046 -0.041 
 (4.35)*** (3.82)*** 
Leverage -0.723 -0.719 
 (10.49)*** (10.47)*** 
Sales growth 0.239 0.239 
 (14.03)*** (14.04)*** 
Delaware 0.065 0.068 
 (2.58)*** (2.73)*** 
Diversification -0.188 -0.187 
 (4.21)*** (4.19)*** 
R&D 0.257 0.271 
 (3.91)*** (4.11)*** 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
Constant 2.047 2.009 
 (5.67)*** (5.56)*** 
   
Observations 9929 9929 




Table 7 – The influence of the individual blockholder’s identity on the ownership-firm value 
relationship 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q and all independent variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Largest Individual Second Individual 
   
Largest individual own -0.497 -0.373 
 (1.55) (2.07)** 
Largest individual own
2
 1.152 1.016 
 (3.13)*** (3.99)*** 
Largest individual wedge -0.718 -0.729 
 (4.53)*** (4.52)*** 
Largest individual own*NonFounder -0.014  
 (0.03)  
Largest individual own
2
*NonFounder -0.424  
 (0.68)  
Largest individual own*Second -1.267 1.582 
 (2.05)** (1.69)* 
Largest individual own
2
*Second 2.031 -1.432 
 (2.36)** (1.12) 
Largest individual own*Second*NonFounder -1.336  
 (2.36)**  
Largest individual own
2
*Second*NonFounder 3.103  
 (2.58)***  
Second 0.223 0.378 
 (2.41)** (3.43)*** 
NonFamily -0.057  
 (0.96)  
Largest individual own*Second_NonFounder  -4.859 
  (4.17)*** 
Largest individual own
2
*Second_NonFounder  6.485 
  (4.04)*** 
Second_NonFounder  0.514 
  (3.00)*** 
Control variables   
Ln(Firm size) -0.042 -0.041 
 (3.94)*** (3.82)*** 
Leverage -0.714 -0.720 
 (10.38)*** (10.52)*** 
Sales growth 0.239 0.241 
 (14.06)*** (14.11)*** 
Delaware 0.072 0.064 
 (2.87)*** (2.56)** 
Diversification -0.190 -0.189 
 (4.25)*** (4.24)*** 
R&D 0.262 0.264 
 (3.98)*** (4.01)*** 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
Constant 2.072 1.114 
 (5.67)*** (5.31)*** 
Observations 9929 9929 




Table 8 – The influence of corporate blockholder on the ownership-firm value relationship 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. All independent variables are as 
defined in Appendix 1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-











Largest individual wedge -0.754 
 (4.70)*** 

















Control variables  












Year dummies YES 













Table 9 – Sample selection and distribution by year 
 
Panel A – Selection of the newly public firm sample 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
      
Common stock issues 615 516 539 792 2,462 
Less      
Units 91 108 86 122 407 
carve-outs 98 69 40 64 271 
LBOs 40 12 11 15 78 
financial  48 29 31 62 170 
foreign 10 4 19 27 60 
CRSP/Compustat not available  3 4 1 4 12 
unclear 1st day of trading 0 2 0 1 3 
roll-ups 0 0 2 11 13 
       




Panel B – Distribution of firm-years with available ownership data by post-IPO year 
 
      Post-IPO year       
IPO  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  Total 
                
1,442
57
  1,339 1,200 1,070 920 797 699 629 569 524 455 402 356  10,402 







                                                          
57
 Six of the 1,448 firms disappear from the sample before the first proxy date after IPO. No data is 
available for these firms. 
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Table 10 – Presence of firm insider and outsider blockholders, by corporate presence 
The table reports the presence of firm insiders and outsiders, by corporate presence. Percentage of sample 
is reported in square brackets. 
 
  No Corporate Presence Corporate Presence 






























Table 11 – Summary statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables used. Firm 
size is the total value of assets in millions and firm age is the number of years since CRSP listing. All other 
variables are as described in Appendix 2. Leverage is winsorized at 1, R&D is winsorized at 2, and Tobin’s 
q is winsorized at 5. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the overall sample and Panel B provides 
summary statistics by ownership structure classification. Differences in mean between ownership structure 
types are reported for each variable, along with the significance of the two-sample t-tests for mean. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean  Median 
    
Tobin’s q 2.271  1.808 
Insider ownership 0.223  0.133 
Insider wedge 0.018  0 
Outsider block 0.108  0 
Corporate block 0.735  1 
Ln(Firm size) 4.608  4.522 
Leverage 0.180  0.065 
Sales growth 0.365  0.168 
Delaware 0.582  1 
Diversification 0.883  1 
R&D 0.124  0.004 








Firm size Leverage Sales growth Delaware Diversif. R&D 
        
1 No blocks 4.732 0.175 1.333 0.597 0.861 0.153 
2 Only insider blocks 4.332 0.181 1.368 0.447 0.920 0.065 
3 Only outsider blocks 4.063 0.113 1.369 0.483 0.862 0.134 
4 
Only insider and 
outsider blocks 
3.831 0.173 1.433 0.508 0.888 0.040 
5 Only corporate blocks 4.932 0.178 1.343 0.706 0.856 0.199 
6 
Only insider and 
corporate blocks 
4.666 0.185 1.376 0.570 0.890 0.102 
7 
Only outsider and 
corporate blocks 
4.289 0.182 1.432 0.659 0.826 0.236 
8 
All three blockholder 
types 











 1 less 2 0.400*** -0.006 -0.035 0.150*** -0.058*** 0.088*** 
 1 less 3 0.669* 0.062 -0.037 0.115 -0.001 0.020 
 1 less 4 0.901*** 0.002 -0.100 0.090** -0.026 0.113*** 
 1 less 5 -0.200* -0.003 -0.010 -0.108*** 0.006 -0.045** 
 1 less 6 0.066 -0.010 -0.043 0.028 -0.029 0.051*** 
 1 less 7 0.443*** -0.006 -0.099 -0.062 0.036 -0.083*** 
 1 less 8 0.650*** 0.022 -0.008 0.054 0.007 0.035* 
 2 less 3 0.269 0.068 -0.001 -0.036 0.058 -0.069** 
 2 less 4 0.501*** 0.008 -0.065 -0.060** 0.032** 0.025*** 
 2 less 5 -0.600*** 0.003 0.025 -0.258*** 0.064*** -0.134*** 
 2 less 6 -0.334*** -0.005 -0.008 -0.122*** 0.029*** -0.037*** 
 2 less 7 0.043 -0.001 -0.064 -0.212*** 0.094*** -0.171*** 
 2 less 8 0.250*** 0.028** 0.028 -0.096*** 0.065*** -0.053*** 
 3 less 4 0.232 -0.060 -0.064 -0.025 -0.026 0.094*** 
 3 less 5 -0.869*** -0.065 0.027 -0.223*** 0.006 -0.065 
 3 less 6 -0.603** -0.072 -0.007 -0.087 -0.028 0.032 
 3 less 7 -0.226 -0.068 -0.063 -0.176* 0.036 -0.102 
 3 less 8 -0.019 -0.040 0.029 -0.060 0.008 0.015 
 4 less 5 -1.101*** -0.005 0.090* -0.198*** 0.032* -0.159*** 
 4 less 6 -0.835*** -0.013 0.057 -0.062** -0.003 -0.062*** 
 4 less 7 -0.459*** -0.009 0.001 -0.152*** 0.062** -0.196*** 
 4 less 8 -0.251** 0.020 0.093 -0.036 0.034 -0.079*** 
 5 less 6 0.267*** -0.008 -0.034 0.136*** -0.035*** 0.097*** 
 5 less 7 0.643*** -0.004 -0.089 0.046 0.030 -0.037 
 5 less 8 0.850*** 0.025** 0.002 0.162*** 0.002 0.080*** 
 6 less 7 0.376*** 0.004 -0.056 -0.090** 0.065*** -0.134*** 
 6 less 8 0.583*** 0.032*** 0.036 0.026 0.036** -0.017 








Table 12 – The relationship between insider ownership and firm value 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. Tobin’s q is winsorized at 5. All 
independent variables are as defined in Appendix 2. Regression results reported in column 2 are estimated 
using non-linear two-stage least squares (N2SLS). The instruments for the ownership of the largest inside 
blockholder are Sales/Regional sales %Sales, as defined in Appendix 2. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
(White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 OLS N2SLS 
   
Insider ownership -0.531 -4.977 
 (3.42)*** (5.42)*** 
Insider ownership squared 1.131 4.877 
 (5.17)*** (3.61)*** 
Insider wedge -0.600 1.564 
 (4.03)*** (1.97)** 
Control variables   
Ln(Firm size) -0.042 -0.096 
 (3.97)*** (7.58)*** 
Leverage -0.724 -0.797 
 (10.51)*** (12.75)*** 
Sales growth 0.238 0.244 
 (13.98)*** (15.47)*** 
Delaware 0.066 -0.053 
 (2.65)*** (1.75)* 
Diversification -0.188 -0.163 
 (4.21)*** (3.59)*** 
R&D 0.263 0.033 
 (3.97)*** (0.48) 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
Constant 1.644 2.508 
 (13.95)*** (13.55)*** 
   
Observations 9921 9846 
R-squared 0.24  
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Table 13 – The influence of the presence of outsider and corporate blockholders on the ownership-
firm value relationship 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. Tobin’s q is winsorized at 5. All 
independent variables are as defined in Appendix 2. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are 
used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS N2SLS 
   
Insider ownership -0.906 -6.069 
 (3.12)*** (2.89)*** 
Insider ownership squared 1.576 6.968 
 (4.72)*** (2.92)*** 
Insider wedge -0.625 0.886 
 (4.19)*** (0.89) 
Insider ownership*Outsider  -1.803 -15.055 
 (3.25)*** (2.97)*** 
Insider ownership squared*Outsider 3.004 27.97 
 (3.48)*** (3.71)*** 
Insider ownership*Corporate 1.040 5.444 
 (2.94)*** (2.19)** 
Insider ownership squared*Corporate -1.721 -12.767 
 (3.57)*** (-3.65)*** 
Outsider 0.125 -0.249 
 (1.77)* (0.38) 
Corporate -0.081 -0.242 
 (1.38) (0.54) 
Control variables   
Ln(Firm size) -0.043 -0.135 
 (4.02)*** (6.89)*** 
Leverage -0.715 -0.693 
 (10.39)*** (9.45)*** 
Sales growth 0.237 0.248 
 (13.93)*** (13.35)*** 
Delaware 0.068 -0.048 
 (2.71)*** (1.32) 
Diversification -0.188 -0.176 
 (4.20)*** (3.25)*** 
R&D 0.265 -0.002 
 (4.00)*** (0.03) 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
Constant 1.697 3.055 
 (13.24)*** (6.94)*** 
   
Observations 9921 9846 
R-squared 0.24  
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Table 14 – Subsample analysis of the relationship between insider ownership and firm value, by 
blockholder presence classification 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity to the book value of assets. Tobin’s q is winsorized at 5. Type A 
firms have no corporate and no outsider blockholders. Type B firms have corporate blockholders but no 
outsider blockholders. Type C firms have outsider blockholders but no corporate blockholders. Type D 
firms have both corporate and outsider blockholders. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix 
2. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Type A Type B Type C Type D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Insider ownership -0.584 0.067 -4.286 -1.295 
 (1.78)* (0.28) (3.48)*** (1.48) 
Insider ownership squared 1.323 -0.101 6.613 2.061 
 (3.57)*** (0.25) (4.14)*** (1.17) 
Insider wedge -0.605 -0.716 1.243 -0.199 
 (2.82)*** (2.87)*** (0.87) (0.20) 
Control variables     
Ln(Firm size) -0.018 -0.039 -0.152 -0.119 
 (0.87) (2.88)*** (2.33)** (2.64)*** 
Leverage -1.176 -0.548 -0.841 -0.985 
 (7.88)*** (6.55)*** (1.75)* (4.52)*** 
Sales growth 0.290 0.237 0.066 0.183 
 (8.31)*** (11.08)*** (0.75) (3.05)*** 
Delaware 0.090 0.064 0.130 -0.017 
 (1.83)* (2.01)** (0.86) (0.16) 
Diversification -0.067 -0.234 -0.028 -0.191 
 (0.70) (4.28)*** (0.11) (1.21) 
R&D 0.927 0.165 1.632 0.188 
 (4.22)*** (2.29)** (2.82)*** (0.69) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant 1.576 1.649 0.940 2.623 
 (3.54)*** (12.09)*** (1.67)* (7.11)*** 
     
Observations 2249 6607 405 660 
R-squared 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.29 







Table 15 – Subsample analysis of the relationship between insider ownership and firm value, by seasoning and blockholder presence classification 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity to the book 
value of assets. Tobin’s q is winsorized at 5. Younger (older) firms are those occurring within (after) seven years following their IPO. All independent variables 
are as defined in Appendix 2. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Insider ownership -0.154 -1.361 -0.264 0.907 -4.339 1.255 -1.866 0.272 
 (0.39) (2.04)** (0.91) (2.31)** (3.03)*** (0.26) (1.77)* (0.14) 
Insider own. squared 1.030 1.273 0.663 -2.075 6.188 1.146 3.052 -1.229 
 (2.37)** (1.67)* (1.35) (3.14)*** (3.31)*** (0.18) (1.58) (0.27) 
Insider wedge -0.593 0.142 -0.801 -0.270 3.049 -1.790 -1.826 1.155 
 (2.24)** (0.39) (2.33)** (0.87) (1.78)* (0.43) (1.28) (0.61) 
Control variables         
Ln(Firm size) -0.013 -0.051 -0.026 -0.061 -0.099 -0.213 -0.031 -0.249 
 (0.48) (1.40) (1.41) (3.13)*** (1.26) (1.30) (0.50) (4.06)*** 
Leverage -1.537 -0.205 -0.742 -0.120 -1.419 2.795 -1.264 -0.610 
 (8.33)*** (0.74) (6.61)*** (0.96) (2.44)** (2.55)** (4.75)*** (1.70)* 
Sales growth 0.278 0.361 0.231 0.255 0.057 0.413 0.171 0.085 
 (7.70)*** (3.57)*** (10.09)*** (4.38)*** (0.58) (2.44)** (2.59)*** (0.86) 
Delaware 0.091 0.128 0.094 0.024 0.152 -0.403 0.029 0.038 
 (1.61) (1.18) (2.32)** (0.49) (0.90) (0.68) (0.22) (0.21) 
Diversification -0.095 -0.081 -0.184 -0.237 -0.077 -1.351 -0.195 -0.092 
 (0.66) (0.62) (2.23)** (3.21)*** (0.22) (1.79)* (0.76) (0.40) 
R&D 0.848 1.399 0.187 0.020 1.523 8.671 0.335 -0.279 
 (4.12)*** (1.49) (2.20)** (0.16) (2.78)*** (2.70)*** (1.04) (0.64) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 2.931 1.300 0.708 3.314 2.513 1.167 1.430 3.078 
 (4.73)*** (3.37)*** (6.53)*** (6.44)*** (3.81)*** (1.29) (3.91)*** (6.12)*** 
Observations 1810 439 4528 2079 326 79 449 211 
R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.56 0.25 0.55 
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Table 16 – Review of the insider ownership-firm value relationship literature 
 
























Concave Concave relationship: linear 
term positive and significant, 





JF 2003 1992 - 
1999 
S&P 500 Family 1. Linear 
2. Quadratic 
 
Concave Significant concave relationship Consistent 
Cho JFE 
1998 
1991 Fortune 500 Officers and 
directors 
Piecewise linear Concave Concave relationship: significant 
positive from 0-7%, significant 

















Insignificant 1. Concave relationship using 
cash flow rights 











NYSE firms Present and all 
former CEOs 
still on board of 
directors 
Piecewise linear Concave Significant non-monotonic 
relationship between managerial 
ownership and q: positive (0 to 
1%), decreasing (1 to 5%), 
increasing (5 to 20%), 






















Insignificant 1. Insignificant relationship 
2. Some evidence of concave 



















Piecewise linear Insignificant 1935 sample: Concave 
relationship: significant positive 
from 0-5%, significant negative 
from 5-25%, insignificant >25% 
1995 sample: Linear 
relationship: significant positive 
from 0-5%, insignificant from 5-


























2. Officers and 
directors 
Quadratic Concave 1. Concave relationship using 
CEO ownership 





















Concave 1. Significant concave 
relationship 
2. Piecewise results: 
significantly positive 
relationship for 0-5% range, 




































Concave Concave relationship: 
significantly positive in 0-5% 
range, significantly negative in 
5-25% range, increasing but 
















































































Linear Insignificant Large increases in insider 
ownership lead to increases in 
firm value; no evidence that 
decreases in insider ownership 















Linear Insignificant 1. Significantly positive 
relationship using CEO 
ownership 
2. Insignificant positive 
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Table 17 – Distribution by IPO year and sample selection 
 
Panel A – Number of IPOs by year over sample period 
 
IPO Sample by Year 









    
Total 2,613  
 
 
Panel B – Matching the IPO sample to Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database 
 
Matching IPOs to Dealscan 
1993 - 2000 IPOs 2,613 
No Dealscan match available 864 
# of Matched Firms 1,749 
  
Total Packages 5,724 
Loan purpose is LBO/MBO or takeover 851 
Currency is non-$USD 4 
Not completed deal 86 
 4,783 
  
Total Loans 6,715 
Covenants and loan yield unavailable 2,069 
Loans by firms having loans only before or after IPO  2,133 
Loans not closest to those occurring before or after  IPO 1,484 








Table 18 – Covenant intensity distribution 
The table reports the mean and median statistics for the covenant intensity measure and its components by 
loan year. Covintensity is the sum of the dummy variables indicating the presence of each of the following: 
two or more financial ratio covenants, asset sweep, debt sweep, equity sweep, dividend restriction, and 
secured covenants, respectively.  
 
Loan Year   ratiodummy asweep dsweep esweep divrest secured Covintensity 
1992 (N=20) Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.750 0.750 
  Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1993 (N=86) Mean 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.814 0.849 
  Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1994 (N=125) Mean 0.040 0.040 0.008 0.024 0.096 0.696 0.904 
  Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1995 (N=113) Mean 0.389 0.248 0.097 0.124 0.558 0.770 2.186 
  Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
1996 (N=156) Mean 0.622 0.282 0.173 0.199 0.603 0.833 2.711 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
1997 (N=148) Mean 0.669 0.189 0.101 0.101 0.574 0.784 2.419 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
1998 (N=147) Mean 0.687 0.319 0.197 0.211 0.741 0.830 2.990 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
1999 (N=74) Mean 0.689 0.311 0.216 0.257 0.824 0.851 3.149 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
2000 (N=62) Mean 0.629 0.419 0.290 0.242 0.774 0.774 3.129 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
2001 (N=27) Mean 0.481 0.111 0.074 0.038 0.667 0.741 2.111 
  Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
2002 (N=22) Mean 0.545 0.091 0.091 0.045 0.773 0.818 2.364 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
2003 (N=12) Mean 0.583 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.583 1.000 2.167 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
2004 (N=9) Mean 0.556 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.667 0.889 3.111 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
2005 (N=14) Mean 0.571 0.429 0.286 0.143 0.571 0.786 2.790 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
2006 (N=8) Mean 0.500 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.750 0.500 2.500 
  Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 2.000 
2007 (N=2) Mean 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.500 
  Median 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.500 
Total (N=1029) Mean 0.475 0.211 0.126 0.133 0.521 0.791 2.258 





Table 19 – Distribution of transition types based on IPO year 
The table reports the number of cases, by the year of IPO, for each loan transition type, where NN is non-syndicated to non-syndicated loans, NS is non-
syndicated to syndicated loans, SN is syndicated to non-syndicated loans, and SS is syndicated to syndicated loans. The corresponding percentage of each type 
per IPO year is denoted in parentheses and the proportion of the sample in each IPO year and type is denoted in square brackets. 
 
 












































































































Table 20 – Summary statistics for overall sample 
The table reports the summary statistics for the overall sample by pre-IPO and post-IPO. Covenant Intensity is the sum of the dummy variables indicating the 
presence of each of the following: two or more financial ratio covenants, asset sweep, debt sweep, equity sweep, dividend restriction, and secured covenants. 
Loan Yield is the yield in basis points on the firm’s loan over the 6-month LIBOR. Assets, Sales, and Loan Amount are in $millions. Leverage is defined as the 
book value of long-term debt over assets and is winsorized at one. VC-Backed Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has venture capitalist 
backing. Syndicated is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is syndicated. Number of Lenders is a count variable of the number of lenders listed on a loan 
package. ZScore is the Altman z-score estimated for private firms and is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Differences in sample mean and proportion are 
reported, along with the significance of the two-sample t-tests for mean and proportion differences. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  N Mean Median 
 Variable Pre-IPO Post-IPO Pre-IPO Post-IPO Difference Pre-IPO Post-IPO Difference 
         
Covenant Intensity 517 512 2.130 2.387 0.257** 2 2 1** 
Loan Yield (bp) 517 512 272.784 223.196 -49.588*** 275 225 -50*** 
Loan Amount ($ mil) 517 512 64.393 124.079 59.686*** 15 38.350 23.350*** 
Loan Maturity (months) 495 484 37.008 40.756 3.748** 29 36 7*** 
Syndicated Dummy 492 506 0.424 0.706 0.282*** 0 1 1*** 
Number of Lenders 508 472 1.841 2.940 1.099*** 1 1 1*** 
VC-Backed Firm Dummy 517 512 0.544 0.531 -0.013 1 1 0 
Assets ($ mil) 462 454 206.087 427.846 221.759*** 55.514 150.178 94.664*** 
Leverage 517 512 0.349 0.354 0.005 0.236 0.284 0.048 
ZScore 433 442 1.979 1.908 -0.071 1.992 1.814 -0.178 
  









Table 21 – Firm and loan characteristics by transition type 
Panel A of the table reports the summary statistics at the time of IPO by transition type, where NN is non-syndicated to non-syndicated loans, NS is non-
syndicated to syndicated loans, SN is syndicated to non-syndicated loans, and SS is syndicated to syndicated loans. Assets are in $millions. Leverage is defined 
as the book value of long-term debt over assets and is winsorized at one. Firm age is in number of years since founding. Panel B reports the summary statistics 
for both pre- and post-IPO loan size and maturity by transition type. Loan size is the natural log of the loan amount in thousands. Maturity is the natural log of 
the number of months of the loan. Differences in sample mean and proportion are reported, along with the significance of the two-sample t-tests for mean and 
proportion differences. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A – Summary statistics of firm characteristics at IPO by type 
 
 
ASSETS LEVERAGE FIRM AGE 
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
          
Type NN 112 40.987 26.972 125 0.275 0.118 125 12.32 9 
Type NS 115 73.347 43.938 125 0.287 0.191 125 13.704 8 
Type SN 13 121.068 47.671 15 0.428 0.369 15 8.933 6 
Type SS 156 481.648 179.611 178 0.471 0.431 178 21.596 11.5 
          
Type Differences 
         
          















































Panel B – Summary statistics for loan characteristics by type 
 
   
LoanSize Maturity 
  
N Mean Median Mean Median 
       
Overall Pre-IPO 517 16.774 16.588 3.298 3.397 
 




0.770*** 0.900*** 0.167*** 0.217*** 
Type NN Pre-IPO 125 15.805 15.751 2.964 2.639 
 




0.384*** 0.463*** 0.109 0.539 
Type NS Pre-IPO 125 16.125 16.213 3.069 3.178 
 




1.302*** 1.186*** 0.370*** 0.405*** 
Type SN Pre-IPO 15 16.751 16.973 3.483 3.611 
 




-0.402 -0.759 -0.714** -1.126** 
Type SS Pre-IPO 178 18.202 18.118 3.822 4.06 
 




0.381*** 0.534*** -0.054 0.017 
       
Type Differences 
 
   
       
Type NN - Type NS Pre-IPO  -0.320*** -0.463*** -0.105 -0.539 
 
Post-IPO  -1.238*** -1.186*** -0.366*** -0.405*** 
Type NN - Type SN Pre-IPO  -0.946*** -1.222*** -0.519** -0.971** 
 
Post-IPO  -0.160 0 0.304 0.693 
Type NN - Type SS Pre-IPO  -2.397*** -2.367*** -0.858*** -1.421*** 
 
Post-IPO  -2.394*** -2.438*** -0.695*** -0.899*** 
Type NS - Type SN Pre-IPO  -0.626** -0.759** -0.414* -0.432* 
 
Post-IPO  1.078*** 1.186*** 0.670*** 1.099*** 
Type NS - Type SS Pre-IPO  -2.077*** -1.905*** -0.753*** -0.882*** 
 
Post-IPO  -1.156*** -1.253*** -0.329*** -0.494*** 
Type SN - Type SS Pre-IPO  -1.451*** -1.145*** -0.339** -0.450* 
 







Table 22 – Univariate comparisons of covenant intensity 
The table reports pre- and post-IPO levels and changes in covenant intensity, Covintensity, defined as the 
sum of the dummy variables indicating the presence of each of the following: two or more financial ratio 
covenants, asset sweep, debt sweep, equity sweep, dividend restriction, and secured covenants. The table 
includes the overall sample and subsamples based on loan-type transition, where NN is non-syndicated to 
non-syndicated loans, NS is non-syndicated to syndicated loans, SN is syndicated to non-syndicated loans, 
and SS is syndicated to syndicated loans. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
  
N Mean Median 
     
Overall Pre-IPO 517 2.130 2 
 





Type NN Pre-IPO 125 1.424 1 
 





Type NS Pre-IPO 125 1.736 1 
 





Type SN Pre-IPO 15 2.667 3 
 





Type SS Pre-IPO 178 2.842 3 
 





     
Type Differences 
 




Type NN - Type NS Pre-IPO  -0.312** 0** 
 
Post-IPO  -0.902*** -1*** 
Type NN - Type SN Pre-IPO  -1.243*** -2*** 
 
Post-IPO  -0.708*** -1** 
Type NN - Type SS Pre-IPO  -1.419*** -2*** 
 
Post-IPO  -1.256*** -2*** 
Type NS - Type SN Pre-IPO  -0.931*** -2* 
 
Post-IPO  0.195 0 
Type NS - Type SS Pre-IPO  -1.107*** -2*** 
 
Post-IPO  -0.354 -1 
Type SN - Type SS Pre-IPO  -0.176 0 
 







Table 23 – Univariate comparisons of loan yields 
The table reports pre- and post-IPO levels and changes in loan yield, Yield, defined as the yield in basis 
points on the firm’s loan over the 6-month LIBOR. The table includes the overall sample and subsamples 
based on pre- to post-IPO loan-type transition, as defined in Appendix 3. ***, **, and * indicate significant 




N Mean Median 
     
Overall Pre-IPO 517 272.784 275 
 





Type NN Pre-IPO 125 305.113 305 
 





Type NS Pre-IPO 125 290.350 292.5 
 





Type SN Pre-IPO 15 285.833 255 
 





Type SS Pre-IPO 178 231.523 250 
 





     
Type Differences 
 




Type NN - Type NS Pre-IPO  14.763 -12.5 
 
Post-IPO  41.673*** 45*** 
Type NN - Type SN Pre-IPO  19.279 50 
 
Post-IPO  13.611 5 
Type NN - Type SS Pre-IPO  73.590*** 55*** 
 
Post-IPO  56.655*** 80*** 
Type NS - Type SN Pre-IPO  4.517 37.5 
 
Post-IPO  -28.062 -40 
Type NS - Type SS Pre-IPO  58.828*** 42.5*** 
 
Post-IPO  14.982 35* 
Type SN - Type SS Pre-IPO  54.311** 5 
 







Table 24– The effect of the IPO on covenant intensity and loan yields 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Covintensity, as defined in Appendix 3.  For specifications (1) to (4), standard OLS is used. For specifications (5) to (8), 
Poisson regressions are used. Specifications (1) and (5) are for the overall sample, which is the combination of Types NN, NS, and SS. Specifications (2), (3), 
(4), and (6), (7), (8) are for Types NN, NS, and SS firms, respectively. The dependent variable in Panel B is Yield, defined as the yield in basis points on the 
firm’s loan over the 6-month LIBOR. Standard OLS is used for all specifications in Panel B, where specification (1) is for the overall sample and specifications 
(2), (3), and (4) are Types NN, NS, and SS firms, respectively, as defined in Appendix 3. All independent and control variables are as defined in Appendix 3.  
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A – Covenant intensity  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SPECIFICATION OLS OLS OLS OLS POISSON POISSON POISSON POISSON 
SAMPLE OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS 
         
PostIPO -0.325 -0.444 0.482 -0.359 -0.111 -0.301 0.171 -0.111 
 (2.64)*** (2.57)** (1.85)* (1.37) (2.35)** (3.11)*** (1.53) (1.49) 
LoanSize 0.413 0.023 0.143 0.658 0.173 0.015 0.100 0.215 
 (6.10)*** (0.17) (1.10) (3.91)*** (5.96)*** (0.19) (1.59) (3.78)*** 
PostIPO*LoanSize -0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.39) (0.99) (1.03) (0.19) (2.39)** (1.05) (0.04) (0.53) 
Maturity 0.221 0.058 0.054 0.585 0.117 0.023 0.030 0.225 
 (2.85)*** (0.69) (0.45) (2.95)*** (3.19)*** (0.43) (0.51) (2.81)*** 
FirmSize -0.109 -0.023 0.023 -0.479 -0.058 -0.002 0.011 -0.172 
 (1.67)* (0.32) (0.19) (3.69)*** (2.21)** (0.05) (0.22) (3.82)*** 
Leverage 0.633 0.181 1.030 0.087 0.221 0.198 0.468 0.015 
 (2.03)** (0.41) (1.85)* (0.15) (2.04)** (0.73) (2.12)** (0.09) 
ZScore -0.002 0.028 0.016 -0.116 -0.002 0.012 0.009 -0.040 
 (0.06) (1.17) (0.30) (1.34) (0.22) (0.84) (0.40) (1.51) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.643 5.372 -3.715 -10.795 -3.689 1.888 -1.212 -4.665 
 (4.00)*** (2.48)** (1.76)* (2.73)*** (7.74)*** (1.42) (1.37) (4.75)*** 
         
Observations 697 197 212 288 701 199 213 289 
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.39     
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Panel B – Loan yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SAMPLE OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS 
     
PostIPO -32.757 -28.410 -53.893 -36.397 
 (4.17)*** (1.64) (2.43)** (2.83)*** 
LoanSize -31.696 -54.173 -27.115 -8.963 
 (5.18)*** (3.31)*** (2.36)** (0.88) 
PostIPO*LoanSize 0.025 -0.077 0.021 0.001 
 (2.18)** (0.19) (0.41) (0.03) 
Maturity -9.589 -15.876 -14.608 10.774 
 (1.19) (1.43) (0.94) (0.70) 
FirmSize -4.210 0.733 -2.011 -10.266 
 (0.74) (0.05) (0.19) (1.38) 
Leverage 87.230 18.728 143.382 56.818 
 (4.12)*** (0.29) (3.79)*** (1.77)* 
ZScore -6.778 -10.415 -3.125 -7.154 
 (2.81)*** (2.43)** (0.83) (1.69)* 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant 872.201 1,370.501 593.087 439.855 
 (10.17)*** (6.37)*** (3.03)*** (2.93)*** 
     
Observations 697 197 212 288 








Table 25 – The differential effect of the IPO on covenant intensity and loan yields 
For specifications (1) and (2), the dependent variable is Covintensity, defined in Appendix 3.  For 
specification (1), standard OLS is used. For specification (2), a Poisson regression for censoring at lower 
and upper levels of 0 and 6, respectively, is used. For specification (3), the dependent variable is Yield, 
defined in Appendix 3, and standard OLS is used. All independent and control variables are defined in 
Appendix 3.  Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Covintensity Yield 
 OLS POISSON OLS 
PostIPO -0.462 -0.196 -23.153 
 (3.07)*** (2.47)** (1.60) 
PostIPO*Type NS 0.398 0.226 -28.761 
 (1.70)* (2.10)** (1.52) 
PostIPO*Type SS 0.159 0.065 -9.194 
 (0.69) (0.68) (0.55) 
Type NS -0.019 0.027 -7.095 
 (0.13) (0.35) (0.52) 
Type SS 0.264 0.164 -18.310 
 (1.30) (1.91)* (1.21) 
LoanSize 0.321 0.125 -23.128 
 (4.44)*** (4.11)*** (3.73)*** 
Maturity 0.249 0.134 -11.656 
 (3.41)*** (3.82)*** (1.53) 
FirmSize -0.105 -0.057 -5.398 
 (1.70)* (2.26)** (1.03) 
Leverage 0.474 0.161 93.652 
 (1.80)* (1.72)* (4.97)*** 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Constant -6.062 -2.422 831.683 
 (5.45)*** (3.09)*** (9.94)*** 
    
Observations 731 736 731 




Table 26 – Joint estimation of covenant intensity and loan yields 
The table reports the results of three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation where the two endogenous 
dependent variables of interest are Covintensity and Yield, each as defined in Appendix 3. The instrumental 
variables used are Capsale, R&D, and Adsale, each as defined in Appendix 3. All independent and control 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.  Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Covintensity Yield 
   
PostIPO -0.249 -28.622 
 (2.23)** (4.73)*** 
Covintensity - 9.410 
 - (4.94)*** 
Yield -0.001 - 
 (2.78)*** - 
LoanSize 0.545 -30.912 
 (8.46)*** (8.60)*** 
LoanSize*PostIPO -0.000 0.000 
 (2.58)*** (4.97)*** 
Maturity 0.173 -7.094 
 (2.34)** (1.75)* 
FirmSize -0.249 -16.592 
 (4.20)*** (5.12)*** 
Leverage -0.022 72.833 
 (0.10) (5.89)*** 
ZScore 0.026 -5.870 
 (1.27) (5.29)*** 
Year dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Constant 2.016 878.419 
 (1.93)* (17.20)*** 
   










Table 27 – The effect of switching lenders on covenant intensity and loan yields 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Covintensity, as defined in Appendix 3.  For specifications (1) to (4) ((5) to (8)) in Panel A, OLS (Poisson) regressions are 
used. Specifications (1) and (5) are for the overall sample, which is the combination of Types NN, NS, and SS. Specifications (2) and (6), (3) and (7), and (4) 
and(8) are for Types NN, NS, and SS firms, respectively. The dependent variable in Panel B is Yield, defined as the yield in basis points on the firm’s loan over 
the 6-month LIBOR. Standard OLS is used for all specifications in Panel B, where specification (1) is for the overall sample and specifications (2) to (4) are 
Types NN, NS, and SS firms, respectively, as defined in Appendix 3. All independent and other control variables are as defined in Appendix 3.  Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A – Covenant intensity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SAMPLE OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS 
         
PostIPO -0.284 -0.543 0.608 -0.291 -0.103 -0.378 0.263 -0.095 
 (2.00)** (2.78)*** (2.02)** (0.99) (1.91)* (3.54)*** (2.05)** (1.20) 
PostIPO*SameLender -0.069 0.341 -0.385 -0.087 -0.020 0.258 -0.199 -0.016 
 (0.32) (1.34) (1.02) (0.21) (0.23) (1.89)* (1.35) (0.12) 
SameLender -0.139 -0.346 -0.215 -0.076 -0.053 -0.247 -0.074 -0.011 
 (0.89) (1.66)* (0.64) (0.25) (0.83) (1.99)** (0.54) (0.12) 
LoanSize 0.429 0.025 0.101 0.682 0.178 0.001 0.060 0.224 
 (6.20)*** (0.18) (0.68) (3.95)*** (6.02)*** (0.01) (0.92) (3.87)*** 
PostIPO*LoanSize -0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.28) (0.96) (1.23) (0.13) (2.15)** (0.94) (0.54) (0.54) 
Maturity 0.216 0.059 0.062 0.560 0.118 0.021 0.039 0.222 
 (2.73)*** (0.65) (0.51) (2.75)*** (3.16)*** (0.37) (0.65) (2.75)*** 
FirmSize -0.135 -0.038 0.032 -0.526 -0.068 -0.013 0.016 -0.186 
 (2.03)** (0.53) (0.26) (3.92)*** (2.50)** (0.31) (0.30) (3.99)*** 
Leverage 0.745 0.209 1.008 0.280 0.259 0.218 0.429 0.074 
 (2.45)** (0.47) (1.83)* (0.50) (2.43)** (0.84) (1.96)** (0.46) 
ZScore 0.001 0.031 0.018 -0.096 -0.001 0.013 0.010 -0.034 
 (0.06) (1.29) (0.30) (1.14) (0.11) (0.90) (0.40) (1.31) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.900 2.384 -3.387 -11.180 -3.782 2.292 -2.076 -4.775 
 (4.15)*** (1.22) (1.43) (2.57)** (7.98)*** (1.74)* (2.09)** (4.66)*** 
         
Observations 683 193 208 282 687 195 209 283 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.49 0.51     
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Panel B – Loan yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SAMPLE OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS 
     
PostIPO -36.806 -26.738 -53.493 -43.159 
 (4.00)*** (1.21) (2.23)** (3.21)*** 
PostIPO*SameLender 14.297 -7.305 -1.100 31.909 
 (1.02) (0.28) (0.04) (1.40) 
SameLender -6.025 10.567 16.963 -15.475 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.70) (0.86) 
LoanSize -30.711 -54.616 -27.479 -6.766 
 (4.91)*** (3.30)*** (2.24)** (0.66) 
PostIPO*LoanSize 0.025 -0.072 0.026 -0.005 
 (2.16)** (0.18) (0.47) (0.15) 
Maturity -9.003 -13.463 -13.807 11.716 
 (1.10) (1.13) (0.93) (0.74) 
FirmSize -5.057 1.474 -1.712 -12.204 
 (0.86) (0.09) (0.16) (1.61) 
Leverage 90.586 20.744 144.672 62.914 
 (4.21)*** (0.32) (3.86)*** (1.94)* 
ZScore -6.869 -10.294 -2.999 -6.836 
 (2.77)*** (2.37)** (0.78) (1.62) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant 856.038 1,228.130 599.655 511.308 
 (9.81)*** (5.31)*** (2.88)*** (2.94)*** 
     
Observations 683 193 208 282 




Table 28 – The effect of venture capitalist backing on covenant intensity and loan yields 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Covintensity, as defined in Appendix 3.  For specifications (1) to (4) ((5) to (8)) in Panel A, OLS (Poisson) regressions are 
used. Specifications (1) and (5) are for the overall sample, which is the combination of Types NN, NS, and SS. Specifications (2) and (6), (3) and (7), and (4) 
and(8) are for Types NN, NS, and SS firms, respectively. The dependent variable in Panel B is Yield, defined as the yield in basis points on the firm’s loan over 
the 6-month LIBOR. Standard OLS is used for all specifications in Panel B, where specification (1) is for the overall sample and specifications (2) to (4) are 
Types NN, NS, and SS firms, respectively, as defined in Appendix 3. All independent and other control variables are as defined in Appendix 3.  Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A – Covenant intensity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SAMPLE OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS 
         
PostIPO -0.405 -0.366 0.156 -0.426 -0.162 -0.243 0.025 -0.132 
 (2.41)** (1.54) (0.47) (1.33) (2.54)** (1.86)* (0.17) (1.48) 
PostIPO*NonVC 0.182 -0.161 0.566 0.235 0.116 -0.114 0.259 0.078 
 (0.90) (0.62) (1.58) (0.65) (1.51) (0.83) (1.70)* (0.72) 
NonVC -0.162 0.190 -0.004 -0.418 -0.086 0.127 -0.042 -0.119 
 (1.08) (0.81) (0.01) (1.50) (1.43) (1.06) (0.30) (1.37) 
LoanSize 0.410 0.025 0.132 0.654 0.170 0.017 0.091 0.211 
 (6.06)*** (0.19) (1.01) (3.88)*** (5.90)*** (0.21) (1.42) (3.72)*** 
PostIPO*LoanSize -0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.33) (1.01) (1.07) (0.21) (2.18)** (1.08) (0.10) (0.53) 
Maturity 0.221 0.052 0.044 0.579 0.119 0.018 0.032 0.227 
 (2.85)*** (0.63) (0.37) (2.98)*** (3.25)*** (0.34) (0.54) (2.85)*** 
FirmSize -0.113 -0.008 0.057 -0.492 -0.059 0.007 0.023 -0.173 
 (1.71)* (0.10) (0.46) (3.76)*** (2.24)** (0.15) (0.41) (3.88)*** 
Leverage 0.646 0.153 0.999 0.090 0.223 0.181 0.466 0.008 
 (2.08)** (0.34) (1.80)* (0.16) (2.07)** (0.67) (2.12)** (0.05) 
ZScore 0.004 0.017 -0.004 -0.099 -0.000 0.006 0.004 -0.037 
 (0.15) (0.58) (0.06) (1.14) (0.03) (0.37) (0.18) (1.37) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.506 5.218 -1.146 -9.104 -3.597 1.787 -1.082 -4.538 
 (3.81)*** (2.34)** (0.59) (3.38)*** (7.58)*** (1.34) (1.20) (4.55)*** 
         
Observations 697 197 212 288 701 199 213 289 
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.51     
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Panel B – Loan yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SAMPLE OVERALL TYPE NN TYPE NS TYPE SS 
     
PostIPO -42.501 4.065 -93.369 -49.833 
 (4.33)*** (0.17) (3.57)*** (3.57)*** 
PostIPO*NonVC 22.364 -60.722 83.452 34.759 
 (1.63) (2.27)** (3.18)*** (1.71)* 
NonVC -21.546 46.195 -66.070 -18.919 
 (1.98)** (2.18)** (2.91)*** (1.13) 
LoanSize -32.043 -51.749 -27.797 -9.271 
 (5.28)*** (3.17)*** (2.55)** (0.92) 
PostIPO*LoanSize 0.026 -0.199 0.024 0.008 
 (2.20)** (0.50) (0.49) (0.25) 
Maturity -9.546 -17.300 -14.174 10.606 
 (1.20) (1.57) (0.98) (0.70) 
FirmSize -4.870 2.082 -3.352 -11.013 
 (0.86) (0.13) (0.33) (1.49) 
Leverage 89.188 13.665 146.673 55.667 
 (4.25)*** (0.21) (3.98)*** (1.75)* 
ZScore -6.013 -12.623 -1.869 -6.741 
 (2.41)** (2.90)*** (0.52) (1.54) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant 890.762 1,323.943 646.733 472.103 
 (10.12)*** (6.21)*** (3.61)*** (2.56)** 
     
Observations 697 197 212 288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.31 0.37 0.28 
 
 
